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I. INTRODUCTION 
The theory of economic policy has a long history and no 
attempt Is made here to trace either Its origin or Its develop­
ments» However, for the subject that will be discussed In 
this dissertation It Is enough to mention that this theory took 
a distinctly new shape in the early 1950*s. In the past, econo­
mists developed monetary policy, fiscal policy, trade policy 
and the like Independently, paying little attention to the 
interdependence between the various policy measures and their 
impacts on the entire economic system. Realizing the need for 
an integrated and Interdependent economic policy, Tlnbergen 
(47) in 1952 made a pioneering contribution to the theory of 
quantitative economic policy. 
Recent developments in the theory of quantitative economic 
policy have emphasized its complex structure and put forth 
methods of approaching the policy problem by a method of 
successive approximations (50). However, it should be noted 
that the formal characteristics of the policy problem are no 
different than those that exist in the problem of decision 
making in a firm or business. A national economy is, of 
course, much larger than a firm and the economic planning 
agencies that exist in various countries today do not have the 
same statutory status and degree of control over economic 
policy that a business man has over management decisions. 
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A sûlôntlflo treatment the theory of economic policy 
requires the development of clear and meaningful concepts and 
description of the underlying problem in terms of such concepts 
consistently and as concisely as possible. Once the problem 
is thus posed in a scientific fashion the theory can be 
developed systematically taking advantage of the classical 
theory of the firm, the newer theories of communication, the 
theory of optimal control processes, decision theory, and the 
theory of games. This dissertation therefore attempts (l) to 
develop concepts that will be useful tools in describing the 
economic policy problem, (11) to describe the problem mathe­
matically, and (ill) to develop some methods of approaching 
the policy problem which take their stimulus from other related 
areas of research, ka attempt will also be made to illustrate 
these methods by considering the two major economic policy 
problems (1) Investment policy and (11) stabilization policy# 
An operationally meaningful and scientific theory of 
economic policy requires the description of the problem in 
mathematical terms through a set of structural relations, 
constraints, and an objective or criterion function. Mathe­
matics is a symbolic language which can be used to express 
functional relationships inspired by problems in many different 
solentlflc fields. When problems from different fields are 
described in matheaatloal language they often show striking 
formal similarities and it becomes clear that "economy of 
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effort would result from analyzing these common elements" 
(43, p. 3)« If we reformulate the premises and conclusions 
of some past theoretical work in economic policy in mathematical 
terms we can easily recognize that "essentially the «ame 
inequalities and theorems appeared again and again" (43, p. 3)» 
It would be a very difficult thing to describe mathe­
matically all that we know about the economic environment* 
Even if this could be done the knowledge of mathematical 
analysis we possess would force us to choose a less realistic 
description of the economy so that the resulting model can be 
manipulated with existing tools. Such a description of the 
economy is a useful and indeed an indispensable tool of clear 
thinking in that it saves us from "laborious literary work 
and mental gymnastics of a peculiarly depraved type" (43, p. 6). 
While the real phenomena behind these crude descriptions 
can suggest improvements in the existing knowledge of mathe­
matical analysis, we also find, ironically^  a few economists 
who, over-excited by mathematical niceties, forget that the 
real economy is far removed from their descriptions of it. 
For this reason, it Is very Inqwrtant, when using models based 
on the existing techniques and vocabulary of mathematics, to 
present the economic conclusions only tentatively, with proper 
qualification, and to supplement them by one's own knowledge 
of the real environment. Whether it Is made explicit or not 
it should be kept in mind that this view is held throughout 
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the text of this dissertation. 
The plan of the discussion on the theory of economic 
policy In the following pages can be briefly summarized. 
Chapter II presents the structure of economic policy problems 
In Tlnbargen's framework and examines the shortcomings of 
various illustrative models given by Tlnbergen. Chapter III 
presents a new approach to dealing with the economic policy 
problems. The economic policy problems are identified as 
belonging to a wider class of dynamic decision processes. 
The particular class of linear decision processes is given a 
prograjnming interpretation. Such an interpretation provides 
us a method of obtaining the optimal policy employing well-
known contribution of Kuhn and Tucker (28), and further it 
shows the close relation between the Kuhn-Tucker theory and 
Pontryagin's theory of optimal control processesr Chapter 17 
illustrates the new methods of approach advocated in Chapter 
III, namely the maximum principle and dynamic programming, by 
considering the economic policy problem of regional and/or 
sectoral allocation of Investment. Chapter V deals with 
problems of economic stabilization which are of considerable 
interest both in developed and underdeveloped countries. This 
chapter attempts to show how to choose between alternative 
stabilization policies. In particular the method of finding 
an optimum stabilization policy is illustrated by considering 
Phillips* model of stabilization policy. Chapter VI, the last 
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chapter, makes a few oonoludlng remarks. It is emphasized 
that before we tmdertake the investigation of non-deterministic 
or stochastic models of optimization and control we should 
develop a considerable knowledge of the sensitivity of optimal 
solutions In deterministic dynamic economic policy models to 
alternative estimates of the parameters. 
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II. TINBEHGEN ON THE THEORY OP ECONOMIC POLICY 
A. Structure of Economic Policy Problems 
The theory of economic policy conceits Itself iflth the 
problem of a choice among a set of alternative feasible 
government actions - a choice which would presumably optimize 
a criterion or objective function. In this broad sense the 
theory of economic policy can bo regarded as a member of a 
much wider class of decision processes. In a memorandum 
submitted to the United Nations in 1949 Hagnar Prisch (18). 
described the economic policy problem as a decision model. 
Inspired by Prisch's concept of a decision model, Tinbergen 
(4?) developed a new approach to the theory of economic policy. 
The main feature of Tinbergen's approach was the treatment of 
various public policy measures within a coherent model of the 
economy and of the decision-making process. 
In Tinbergen's framework the economic policy problem 
consists of the following ingredients (48)i 
(I) specification of a social welfare function (or an 
objective function); 
(II) specification of the economic model - a set of 
structural relations among econoialc variables (when we say 
"speoification of the model" we also imply the specification 
of the variables that enter into the model); 
(ill) classification of the variables in the model into 
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targets. Instruments, data and iï^ relevant variables; and 
(Iv) speolfioatlon of boundary conditions or constraints. 
Tinbergen considers the social welfare function as a 
function only of certain variables which are not under the 
direct control of the policy maker. The economic model 
consists of a set of structural equations that can be classi­
fied into (1) behavioral equations, (11) technical relations, 
(ill) institutional relations, and (iv) definiticuml equations. 
The economic model includes several variables some of 
which enter into the social welfare function. These variables 
are called "target variables". The economic model also 
contains some variables that are under control of the govern­
ment. (We use the terms such as government, planning agency, 
policy maker etc. interchangeably to represent the decision 
making authority). These are called "instruments". There are 
other variables that are aasumed as given or determined out­
side the economlo model (i.e. for which there are no structural 
equations that determine them as functions of other variables); 
these exogenous or predetermined variables are called the 
"data". Finally there are variables which aire determined 
within the system but do not enter into the social welfeure 
function) these variables are called "Irrelevant variables". 
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B. Limitations of Tinbergen's Illustrative Mcdels 
Tinbergen's Investigations and examples were limited for 
the most part to models that were linear and also static in 
the sense that time did not enter into them in an essential 
way. Tinbergen and Bos considered a few dynamic models in 
their recent book (50). He further limited his examples to 
models having fixed targets. While the models presented by 
Tinbergen were simplified for expository purposes, they 
illustrate very well the structure of economic policy problems 
and do serve one of the basic requirements of a policy 
prescription, that of establishing clear communication between 
the policy maker and the policy adviser. 
In order to develop a better approximation to the real 
phenomena of economic life and to derive scientifically better 
decision-making procedures, we need to emphasize some of the 
implications of the approach adopted by Tinbergen. His 
approach seems to imply the followingi 
(I) the policy maker's social welfare function is a 
function only of the target variables; 
(II) the crucial problem of finding what values of the 
target variables make the social welfare function a maximum is 
assumed away In prescribing a fixed set of targets; 
(III) the cost of using any instrument or set of Instru­
ments is taken into account only by Imposing a set of boundary 
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conditions on the ranges oirer which certain instruments can 
be employed; 
(iv) with a few exceptions most of the models are static 
so that the optimization problem applies to a single point in 
time (usually the variables are averages or totals for a 
single year); 
(v) the structural equations and boundary conditions are 
all linear; 
(vl) the structural equations are completely deterministic 
and the variables that enter into these equations are assumed 
to be measured without error. 
Solving a fixed target policy problem as suggested by 
Tinbergen amounts to choosing a consistent (feasible) policy 
that will attain the given targets. Whether the given targets 
are of the satisficing type, to use a concept introduced by 
Simon (44), or whether they optimize the social welfare 
function Is not made explicit by Tinbergen. 
By introducing boundary conditions to take account of 
the cost of influencing the Instrument variables one implies 
that there is a cost associated with any Instrument variable 
only If a boundary condition Involving that variable Is 
binding (or Is violated). In general, such a discrete cost-
imputation procedure Is not satisfactory and It Is desirable 
to introduce the cost of administering the control variables 
as an additional term entering the social welfare function or 
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objective function (with a negative sign}* 
Tinbergen distinguishes between a quantitative aiid a 
qualitative economic policy. A qualitative economic policy 
is typically one which introduces instruments not previously 
used and hence changes the structure of the economic model by 
adding new variables and equations to it (or substituting new 
ones for old). A quantitative policy is one which involves 
the manipulatioii of certain instrument variables within the 
framework of a given structure (no variables or equations are 
added to or withdrawn from the existing model), 
Long term economic development or growth policies, 
particularly in underdeveloped countries, are very complex in 
nature and should take into account certain social or extra-
economic characteristics of the nation. Although such 
development policies can be regarded as a combination of both 
quantitative and qualitative types in Tinbergen^ s sense, we 
believe that long-term policies can also be formulated and 
analyzed within a single quantitative framework. Development 
policy problems can be characterized by discrete or continuous 
time dynamic programming problems. In this framework instru­
ments that aie qualitative in character can be given quanti­
tative attributes. Changes in structure that take place under 
the influence of different choices of instruments can suitably 
be described as a model with switching phases, each phase 
operating under a given set of constraints on the instrument 
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variables c 
In development policies the choice of investment projects 
plays a very important role and the corresponding policy model 
must be dynamic in nature. Tinbergen investigated these 
problems only very briefly. We will consider them in more 
detail in a later chapter (Chapter IV) and show the in^ ortance 
of dynamic (as against static) optimization. 
Under certain conditions many nonlinear relations can 
suitably be approximated by linear relations. However, such a 
procedure is not rigorous and is incorrect particularly when 
we deeil with dynamic models. The replacement of truly non­
linear equations by linear equations means in essence the 
replacement of one problem by another whose properties are 
qualitatively different. For this reason it is very important 
to investigate the implications of alternative specifications 
of the model that seem relevant to the practical problems at 
hand. 
In general it is necessary to treat the structural 
equations of the economic model as stochastic and estimate 
them from a sample of observed values of the variable» that 
euter into them. While dealing with a dynamic economic policy 
model, we get more and more information as time goes on. 
Further, we cannot in general assume that the structure which 
existed before the instrument or control variables were used 
to influence the economy remains unchanged after such 
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Influence Is exerted* (For example, a sucoessfwl investment 
program chsmges the coefficients of certain production 
functions). Hence, it is desirable to introduce a sequential 
estimation procedure to keep the structure of the model up to 
date utilizing all available information and to introduce 
adaptive mechanisms in decision making that would at least 
reduce the accumulation of discrepancies between planned and 
actual values of the target variables. 
living outlined Tinbergen*s approach and indicated the 
directions in which improvements in his basic formulation can 
be made, we feel it necessary to restate the economic policy 
problem in a form that fits well into the more general class 
of optimal control processes. 
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III. A NEW APPROACH TO THE THEORY OP ECONOMIC POLICY 
A. Basic Structure of Economic Policy Problems 
In its most general form an optimal economic policy is 
chaiacterized as an optimal choice among alternative feasible 
time paths in transforming the economy from a given initial 
state to a desired final state at the end of a planning 
horizon. 
The theory of linear and nonlinear programming has as 
its forerunner the theory of constrained maxima (or minima)• 
The recent literature on dynamic optimization also builds upon 
the theory of constrained maxima* Analytic and numerical 
methods of solving problems in variational calculus with 
differential and integral constraints have been engaging 
research workers in various fields. The basic contributions 
in this area are by Fontryagln (39, ko) and Bellman (5). 
These developments are very useful in improving the mathe­
matical foundation of the theory of quantitative economic 
policy. 
Often controversies about public policy measures or about 
the policy criteria to be used, by policy makers and economists 
arise from a lack of proper specifications of the problem. 
In many oases we can trace the differences in the policy 
reoommendations of différait individuals to different social 
welfare functions. In some other cases differences in policy 
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prescriptions arise from different assumptions about the 
structure or model of the economy—assumptions which neglect 
various salient features of reality.^  A systematic handling 
of the economic policy problem requires treatment of the 
(1) specification of an objective function (2) specification 
of a quantitative model of the economy and (3) specification 
of the constraints or boundary conditions under which the 
objective function is to be optimized. 
We shall present here a class of dynamic allocation 
processes that characterizes most economic policy problems. 
Let us consider a dynamic economic system consisting of two 
kinds of variables (a) state variables that are not under the 
control of the policy maker and (b) control variables (or 
Instrument variables) that are under the control of the policy­
maker. We can specify the economic policy problem as followst 
(3.1) Maximize W(z) = \g. (y, z, t) dt (objective function) 
o* 
subject to the model 
(3.2) y = g (y, z, t) (model) and the constraints 
(3.3) y(o) = y^  (initial conditions) 
(3.4) (y, z, t)^0; 1 = 1,2, —-, L (local constraints) 
(3.5) (y, z, t)^ Bj_j 1 = 1, 2, —M (global constraints) 
(3.6) /^ (y(T), z(T), T)^ Oj 1 = 1, 2, ,N (terminal conditions) 
T^he lengthy discussions on the choice of techniques by 
Kahn (25), Galenson and Lelbensteln (19), Eckstein (I7) and 
Srlnlvasan (45) may be a case In point; among these, Srlnl-
vasan's model Is the one thect was precisely formulated and 
elegantly handled. His formulation includes a clear specifi­
cation of all three components of a policy problem. 
15 
Where y and z are n state variables and m control variables 
respectively. Equation (3.2) la a vector differential equation, 
each component representing a time path followed by the 
corresponding state variable as a function (linear or non­
linear) of both state and control variables. 
We can supply some economic motivation for the model as 
follows t 
(3.1) implies that the policymaker Is Interested in the 
time paths of specified economic variables such as real 
consumption levels per capita (total and/or for various 
economic groups), levels of employment (total and/or by 
occupational categories), capital stocks or production 
capacity in various economic sectors, and so on; 
(3.2) is a model of the economy includins all variables 
which enter into the policymaker's objective function with 
non-zero coefficients (and other variables also); 
(3.3) describes the state of the economy at the beginning 
of the planning period; 
(3.4) might include stipulations (for specified points in 
time) that real consumption levels not fall below stated 
values, that consumer prices (or the rates of change in 
consumer prices) not exceed stated values, etc.; and they 
might also represent a set of consistency relations; 
(3.5) mlg^ t include stipulations that total manyears of 
employment during the period t = 0 to t * T equal or exceed a 
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certain figure and that cumulative Investment under various 
preasslgned projects does not exceed certain preasslgned 
levels, etc.; and 
(3.6) silent specify that rates of consumption and employ­
ment during the last period (Instant) of the plan must exceed 
certain values and that the size and composition of the stock 
of capital meet certain conditions. 
Definition 3.It Any control variable that Is plecewlse 
continuous Is called a permissible control. 
Definition 3.2; The space (the n-dlmenslonal number space) 
of the n state variables Is called the 
state space. 
Definition 3.3: The space (the m-dlmenslonal number space) 
of m control variables is called the policy 
space. 
Definition 3.4: Given a permissible control vector, z, the 
corresponding vector of state variables 
determined "by It is called the response and 
can be represented by y^ . 
Definition 3.9: A permissible control whose response satisfies 
the constraints (3.3), (3.4), (3.5) and (3,6) 
is called a feasible control. 
Definition 3.6: Any feasible control that satisfies in 
addition the optimizing criterion (3.1) is 
called an optimal control. 
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B. Intertemporal Efficiency and the Principle of Optinality 
Let us consider a two-commodity stock-flow economy. Let 
y^ (t) and ygCt) denote the stocks of the two commodities at 
time t and let z^ (t) and Z2(t) be the respective rates of flow 
(consu]Q>tion at time t). The economy may be described by the 
following equations of statei 
(3.7) yi(t + 1) = 81 (yj(t), ygft), (t), z^{t)) 
(3.8) y2(t + 1) = g2 (yj(t), y2(t), Zj^ (t), Zgft)) 
These equations represent the dynamic economic system 
and show the relation between the stock and flow variables. 
Given the initial stocks of the two commodities y^ (0), y2(0) 
and the initial rates of consumption 2^ (0), 22(0) the stocks in 
the first period, y^ d)» y2(l) are uniquely determined by 
equations (3.7) and (3.8). This is clearly exhibited in 
Figure 1. The point P represents the initial stocks 
y2(0). Corresponding to each choice of the pair (2^ (0), ggtO)) 
we have a unique pair of stocks y^ d)» y2(l) for period 1 that 
lies on the curve ABC. Corresponding to any stock configurât loi 
in period 1 the stocks in period 2 are uniquely determined by 
(3.7) and (3.8) if the pair z^ d), 22(1) is specified. The 
stock profile over time can thus be described by the locus 
of points such as A ,  A * ,  A * * ,  B, B*, B**, or C, C*, 0'*, 
— or A ,  B*, C*', — etc. that lie on successive wave-like 
loci as shown in Figure 1. 
For a given pair of stocks y^ d)» y2d) In period 1, 
18 
Stock of commodity 1 
Figure 1 : Time profile of stocks for alternative decisions 
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the stock configuration in period 2 for all possible choices 
of the flow variables z^ d) Is represented in Figure 1 
by a wave-like replica of the locus ABC. For each point on 
ABC we have a small wavelet representing feasible sto&k 
configuration at period 2. Any point on a wavelet of feasible 
stock configurations in one period can be regarded as the 
initial stock to determine the feasible stock configurations in 
the next period. 
In theoretical optics it is a well known hypothesis that 
the propagation of light is governed by evolutionary or 
advancing spherical waves. Under this hypothesis every point 
of a wave at any instant is regarded as a source of secondary 
waves. 
The well known Huygens* Principle of theoretical physios 
states that the wave front (i.e., the locus of all points 
that can be regarded as the source of secondary waves) 
existing after a certain time is given by the surface which 
envelopes the elementary wavelets (24, pp. 363-364). As we 
shall show presently, this principle can aid us in our search 
for the optimal choice of control variables. 
Let y^  = (yj, y|) and y^  = (y^ , y|) be two alternate 
stock configurations. We Introduce the following partial 
1 2 preference ordering between y-^  and y * 
y^ yy^  (y^  is preferred to y^ ) if 
(1) 
20 
(il) and either 
(111) y^> or 
(1?) y\> Yg or 
2 
(v) both (ill) and (Iv) hold. 
An ordering is called complete If for any two alternate 
1 2 
choices y-*- and y either of the following necessarily holds t 
(I) y^ >-y^  (y^  is preferred to y^ ) 
(II) ySo y^  (y^  is preferred to yl) 
(ill) yy^  (y^  is indifferent to y^ ). 
An ordering that is not complete is called a partial ordering. 
Let Z* be the class of slLI feasible controls z* = 
elementary wavelets in period (t+1) and satisfy the constraints. 
The control» z* 6 Z* are such that 
(I) given any z* € Z* there does not exist any feasible 
control z whose response is preferred to the response of z*. 
Such a control z* is called an admissible control and Z* is 
called the admissible class of controls. In the conventional 
theory the term admissible control is used to denote what we 
termed earlier as a permissible control. We prefer to use 
the word admissible in the sense of decision theory (7). 
(II) Given any feasible z ^  Z* there exists a feasible 
z* 6 Z* such that the response of z* is preferred to the 
response of z. Such a class Z* is called a complete class of 
controls• 
whose responses lie on the envelope of all 
21 
It can be shown that siost policy problems can be suitably 
converted into problems in which linear functions of the values 
of the state variables at the end period are laaximized (see 
page 35). In such a problem it is evident from the precoding 
discussion that the optimal control at any instant is to be 
chosen from the admissible and complete class Z* of controls 
whose responses lie on the envelope. 
In Figure 2 the point of tangency of the objective 
function and the envelope at the Nth period determines the 
control variable z = (zj^ , Zg) at the period that 
maximizes the value of the objective function at the Nth 
period. The choice of the control variables for the earlier 
periods is made using the following* 
Principle of Optimalitvt 
An optimal policy has the property that whatever the 
initial state and initial decisions are, the remaining 
decisions must constitute an optimal policy with regard to 
the states resulting from the first decision. 
Given the point of tangency the principle of 
optimality picks out a unique set of points on the envelopes 
at the (N-l)th, (N-2)th--periods, To each of these points on 
the envelopes there corresponds a control. It is this set of 
controls that constitutes the optimal policy. This is the 
approach of dynamic programming (5)« 
22 
Stock of commodity 1 
Figure 2 : Time profile of stocks under optimal decisions 
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C. The Existence of an Optimal Policy 
It is of considerable theoretical interest to know 
whether an optimal policy exists for the class of continuous 
time allocation processes characterized by (1-1) to (1-6). 
Tlnbergen (49) and Chakravarty (9) have drawn our attention 
to the problem of the existence of an optimal savings program. 
The conceptual difficulties which Chakravarty encounters refer 
to an Infinite planning horizon and the associated difficulties 
in ordering a set of infinite programs. The uncertainty 
associated with the future course of economic events often 
forces one to consider only a finite planning horizon. When 
we consider a finite planning horizon, as Chakravarty states, 
" -— the solution may be crucially dependent on the length 
of time period T and the valuation attached to the terminal 
stock of capital. The latter is not a meaningful concept 
unless we try to take into account what happens beyond T." 
However, planners in the real world do consider only a finite 
planning horizon and they do assign a valuation (arbitrary! ) 
to the terminal stock of capital depending on such aspects as 
the income-producing potential of capital and employment 
generated per unit of capital (where Income and employment at 
the end of the planning horizon are of direct concern to them). 
The choice in such a set of infinite programs may be 
made by choosing a program that makes the value of the 
24 
objeotlve function larger asymptotloally than the value of 
the objective function corresponding to any other program 
(12), There might exist, then, a program that is uniformly 
Inferior to others In a finite time Interval at the beginning 
(however longI) and superior asymptotically In the Infinite 
planning horizon. The different degrees of confidence or 
emphasis attached to different instsints of time make it 
unlikely that such an optimal program would Interest any 
practical policymaker. 
Even in the case where the planning horizon is finite 
the existence of an optimal savings program is not assured. 
Karlln (27, Vol. II, pp. 210-214) has shown the existence and 
uniqueness of an optimal program when the integrand in the 
objective function is a discounted utility function and there 
is only one global constraint on the consumption stream. 
Yaarl (52) has demonstrated the existence of an optimal 
program when the integrand is bounded. 
Karlln and Yaarl considered only one type of constraint, 
a global constraint. In economic policy problems we are more 
often Interested in choosing a set of control variables which 
determine the time path of other state variables. Thus we 
are in general faced with a set of kinematic (differential) 
equations as constraints. Yaarl* s proof for the existence of 
an optimal plan employs two fundamental theorems of real 
analysis (i) Helley's Convergence Theorem and (11) Lebesgue's 
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Theorems His method of proof can be extended to more 
complicated situations. We shall demonstrate the existence 
of an optimal policy under a constraint set more general than 
that which Ysiarl investigated. The following theorem is due 
to Lee and Markus (32)^ . 
Theorem 3.1 (Lee and Markus)t 
Consider the fd. logins policy problem* 
rT 
(3.1) maximize W(z) = \g^  (y,z,t) dt (objective function) 
o 
subject to 
(3.2) 7^  = gj^ (y,z,t); 1 = 1,2 (model) 
and the constraints 
(3.3) y^  (0) = y^ g; 1,2,...,n (initial conditions) 
(3.4) r.(y,z,t) < 0; 1 = 1,2,...,L (local constraints) 
r (3.5) I h^ (y,z,t) ^  1 = 1,2,...,M (global constraints) 
(3.6) s^  (y(T), z(T), t) ^ 0, 1 = 1,2,...,N (terminal conditions) 
where 
So = ^ 0 + & ^OJ (f't) 
have modified both the statement and proof of the 
theorem considerably while maintaining the main features- df 
Lee and Markus* presentation. Lee and Markus were concerned 
with the existence of an optimal control in a system which 
does not explicitly take Into account all the restrictions we 
mentioned In equations (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6). Instead they 
assume that the control variable should belong to a compact 
convex set in am, the policy space. I have also incorporated 
restrictions of the type (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6) Into the 
statement of the theorem and changed the notation altogether. 
The order of presentation of the various steps in the proof 
is also changed. 
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(3.9) 
®i ° ^1 (F't) + (y#t) Zj) 1 = 1,2,,..,n. 
Assume that the funotions r^ (l=l,e..,L), h^ (l=l,•••,H), 
8^ (1^ 1,^  0,l,**#,n) axicL j ( 1 ^  0,1,••#,115 
J = l,..«,m) are all continuous and have continuous deriva­
tives. Assume (1) that the set of feasible controls Is non­
empty and (11) that the graphs of feasible controls z and 
their responses y lie In a non-empty convex compact set 
In X H®. Then there exists an optimal policy. 
Equation (3.9) states that the control variables appear 
linearly and addltlvely (a) In the economic model and (b) In 
the objective function* Although this Is a restrictive 
assumption It should be noted that the differential equations 
in the model could be noi^ inear. Assumption (1) above states 
that there is a bona fide economic policy problem in the sense 
that the model includes instruments z which can influence the 
positions and hence the time paths of the state variables. 
Assumption (11) states in part that if there are two attainable 
1 2 
states and y any state that lies on the line segment 
connecting the two points is also attainable and if z^  and 
are two feasible controls any control that lies on the line 
segment connecting them is also a feasible control. 
Prooft Since the set A of feasible controls is non-empty 
and since the feasible controls z and their responses lie in 
a convex compact set%0/, V(z) is bounded and there exists a 
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rea}. ntimber W such that 
(3.10) CO = sup W(z) = sup \ g« (y,z,t) dt 
z,^ *é»Q/ /o 
(where "sup" Is the standard abbreviation for "supremum"). 
If ^  is a set of only a finite number of permissible z's, 
the theorem is trivially true. On the other hand, if A is a 
set consisting of infinitely many permissible controls z, we 
can select a sequence of controls z^  (t) on (0,7) from A with 
W(z^ (t) ) increasing monotoxjically to Co • Since each z^  is 
measurable (i.e., each component of z^  is real valued and 
Lebesgue-measurable) we can construct a monotone rearrangement 
of each z^ . Using Helley's theorem (36) component-wise for 
each component of the control vectors (z^ (t)) we observe that 
there exists a sub-sequence of (z^ ) and a bounded measurable 
(monotone) function z* such that 
(3.11) z^ (t)—>z*(t) at all points of continuity of s*(t). 
Let y^ (t) be the response of z^ (t). Since the responses are 
uniformly bounded and continuous y^ (t) itself is bounded and 
measurable (for each k). Since all the functions are assumed 
continuous and the planning horizon is assumed finite, by 
applying the arguments of Helley's theorem we can choose a 
sub-sequence (z*) (using the same notation for the sub­
sequence) such that 
(3.12a) 11m yj(t) = yj(t) on 0 ^  t ^  T for 1=1,2, n 
k -^ co 
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(3.12b) 11m f. (yk(t), t) = f* (t) on 0 t ^  T for 1=0,1, 
k —1 n 
(3.12c) 11m l,,(y^ (t),t) = l*\(t) on 0 T for 1 = 0, 1 
k —>oo •'  ^ n, j = 1,2-—m 
(3.12d) 11m 1. . (y^ (t),t) (t) = <2* (t)î at all 
k —^ oo j=i J 1 
continuity points ot ^  i (t) for 1=0, 1, -— n. 
(3.12e) and 11m (t) = z (t) at all continuity points of 
k-^ oo  ^ j 
z* (t) and for all j = 1, 2, -— m. 
The response y^ (t) to z^ (t) In (0,T) Is given by 
(3.13) y? (t) = y,o + (jf. (y^ (T),T) + & l./y^ (T),T) 
1 10 j=i Ij 
° Zj (T^ dT 
By Lebesgue*s convergence theorem (36) we have (except on 
measure zero) 
i 
y, 
^ k-^cK> 1 k—^ 
Ô 
*(t) = 11m y^  (t) = y-Q + 11m \lf, (y^ (T ),T ) + 
1  —  t.-
Z 1,, (y^  (f ),r)^  (-T^  dT or 
m 
m '1) 
(3.14) y* (t) = y^o + (T) + <?* dT 
o * 1 
We shall now show that y (t) Is the response to z*(t). 
(3.15) y*(t) = y.. + llm ( (f {fyr),r) + f? 1 
1  k — J  L r  3 = 1  
L^ebesgue's convergence theorem In the following steps 
takes advantage of the linearity and addltlvlty of the control 
variable. 
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= ^ 10 dT 
+ iim C (z ),r ) (Y) - i,,(y*(-r),r) 
11=' " ' z^ cr^ jar 
+ llB fâ l,,(y*('r'),'r) z* (f ) - 1,, (y* (T ),T) 
' z;(T^  dr 
(yt^ ).T)^ ;(r[| dT 
It can be easily verified that the middle two Integral limits 
vanish and hence we have 
(3.16) y* (t) = y^ o + (y*(r),r) + £ (y*cr),r) 
< a'!' 
which shows that y* (t) Is the response of z* (t). 
We shall next show that the graphs of y* (t), z* (t) 
belong tovlXC^  z H®. SlnceSly Is a çonvex and compact set. 
It can be viewed alternatively as an Intersection of a finite 
or countable number of closed half-spaces (1), 
Let a.y + 2_I biZ, + c >0 
^ 1 1  j_i 3  J  
be one such closed half-space In x R®. Further let I be 
the subset of (0,T) for which y*(t) and z*(t) lie In 
n • m 
H a,y. + biZ, + o < 
1 = 1  ^^  j=l  ^  ^
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Suppose I has a positive meamire. Then we must have 
Ï  +  I l  v â  ^  B  
where V^ _(t) = C 1 if t él 
1^ 0 otherwise 
But by Lebesgue's Theorem 
(3.18) im 1 è a + T. b z* + c(t) dt = 
k->oo oJ Li=l  ^^  3=1 3 3 _J " 
We arrive at a contradiction sincm each member on the left 
side is non-negative. Therefore X has a measure zero. Since 
there are only a finite or countable number of half-spaces, 
y*(t) and z*(t) lie inXLexcept on a set of measure zero. 
y*(t) and z*(t) can be suitably defined so that they belong 
everywhere to each of the finite or countable closed half-
spaces whose intersecticai ISsTX • 
Using similar arguments and the result r^  (y^ (t), z^ (t),t) 
—^  (y*(t), z*(t), t) we can verify that y*(t) and z (t) 
satisfy the constraints (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6). 
Finally let us consider 
(3.19) lim 
k >po w (z^ (t)) =  ^ (y*(t),t) + igj (y*(t),t) 
z* (t)l dt 
^ J 
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= W (z*(t)) = kJ 
This completes the proof of the theorem. An optimal policy-
exists under the conditions of our problem. These Include 
the assumption that the control variables enter Into the model 
and the objective function linearly and addltlvely. However, 
the assumptions we have made are consistent with the formm 
of existing opérationnel mxyJels of national economies and of 
objective functions so far put forward for «quantitative 
economic policy (51). 
D. Methods of Finding the Optimal Policy 
We are In the rare and happy position of having a choice 
between the competitive methods of (1) dynamic programming and 
(11) Pontryagin*s maximum principle. Dynamic programming is 
a very useful method when numerical answers to quantitative 
questions are required and when the number of control variables 
is very small (generally one or two). The maximum principle 
is an elegant method that can show the underlying phenomenon 
and its qualitative characteristics by means of simple and 
rigorous arguments. 
The state of economic system at any instant is character­
ized by the values assumed by the state variables. In 
general, no conceivable economic model can be closed with 
respect to all state variables and we are therefore forced to 
treat some variables as data or exogenous. We introduce a 
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set of preassigned growth paths to such state variables (called 
data) In order to make the economic model closed with respect 
to all the state variables. In most economic development 
policy problems, for example, population is treated as an 
exogenous variable and its growth pattern over the planning 
horizon is specified as a fixed exponential rate of increase. 
Consider the following policy problem; 
(3.1) maximize W(%) = gQ(y,x,t) dt (objective function) 
subject to 
(3.2) 7^  = gj^  (y,z,t); 1 = 1,3....»n (model) 
(3.3) 7^{o) = y^ o* i = l,2,...,n (initial conditions) 
(3.4a) z a closed set in the m-dimensional number space H®. 
1. Some useful transformations (42) 
A geometrical visualization will suggest that we can 
state the problem described by (3«1) to (3.4a) in an equivalent 
way by enlarging the dimensions of the state space to include 
the objective function, i.e. the "return" or "pay-off" of the 
policy, W, up to a given time t as an additional state 
variable - let us say without loss of generality the (n+1)^  ^
state variable, I.e. 
(3.20) let y^ +i(t) = o(y»z»t) dt 
0 
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We then have ons more differential equation corresponding to 
the (n+1)^  ^state variable to be added to the system (3*2)* 
(3.21) = go(y,z,t) 
and we have an additional Initial condition y^ ^^ (o) = 0. 
Our optimizing rule is now equivalent to maximizing the end 
period value of one of the state variables. This is a very 
general case of preference functlonals. There are, however, 
problems in which preference functlonals can not be reduced 
in this way (6, p. 255). If g^  =-l then we have the time 
optimal control problem. Hazlmlzlng a function of the end 
period values of several variables - say 0(yj(T),... ,yjj(T) ) 
could be reduced to optimizing the end period value of a 
single state variable in the following way; 
(3.22) Let yjj+i(t) = 0(yj(t),.,.,yjj(t)) 
then 
This situation is a common occurrence in the theory of 
economic policy. Suppose each of the state variables 
corresponds to either a regional or a sectoral output and 
the policy criterion is to achieve the maximum end period 
national income or output. In this situation in place of 
equations (3.22) and (3.23) we have 
(3.22a) yj,+i(t) = (yj+y2+...+yjj) 
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and 
(3.23a) = g^^ (y,z,t) 
If we have more than one preference fimctlonal that cannot 
"be linked by any valuation or barter terms (the case of vector 
optimization) we will have more than one transformation of the 
above type and the problem reduces to choosing a feasible 
control that maximizes the end period values of two state 
variables. By similar arguments global constraints of the 
type (3.5) In any policy problem can be reduced to the 
terminal conditions or constraints of the type (3.6). One 
such global constraint we often encounter In economic policy 
Is the following* Consider the central government or planning 
agency as having under Its control several measures as control 
variables. It has to Incur certain expenditures In steering 
the economy by means of these variables. Hence we can write 
the total government outlay as a function of the values taken 
by these control variables - say h(z). The policy problem 
will. In general, have gui added constraint that the total 
government outlay during the plan period must not exceed a 
pre-assigned level, G*. This constraint then takes the form 
We have just shown by means of some transformations, how most 
policy problems can be reduced to problems of maximizing the 
G* 
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end period value of one of the state variables. Now we shall 
describe a method for obtaining an analytical solution for the 
optimal economic policy for the following models 
n 
(3.25) maximize W = G.y, (T) 
1=1 ^ 
subject to 
(3.2) yj^  = gj^ (y,z,t), 1 = l,2,,..,n 
the initial conditions 
(3.3) y^ fO) =7^ 0 1 = 1,2,...,n 
and the constraint z , a closed set in the m-dimenslonal 
number space. 
Let U3 now define a set of n auxiliary variables, called 
impulse functions, p^ (t), PgCt),...,Pjj(t) satisfying the 
following set of differential equations and the boundary 
conditionst (A minimizing problem can be converted into a 
mazlmlzlng problem by changing the sign of the objective 
function. In such a case the signs in the following boundary 
conditions will also change.) 
n 
(3.26) Pi = - 2ej(y,z,t) 
WtI 
and 
(3.27) Pi(T) - (1 = 1,2,...,n). 
(1 1,2,...,n) 
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Given a particular choice of the control variable 
(vector) z and the Initial conditions y(0) = we obtain a 
unique response function y^ (t). If we substitute this 
response function (vector) In (3*26) we notice that these 
equations represent a system of linear differential equations 
with known variable coefficients. These equations can be 
solved given the boundary conditions (3.2?) to obtain the 
p^ (t) uniquely as functions of time. Given the control 
variables Zi(t), z_(t), ... z_(t) and the initial conditions 
X c 2a 
y^ tO) = we have before us a procedure for determining 
the responses y^  and the impulse functions p^  uniquely. 
Consider now the following function that is very basic 
for Pontryagln's maximum principle (to be enunciated shortly); 
n , 
(3.28) E(y,p,z,t) * zZ P.g,(y,z,t). j=l J 3 
This function is called the "Hamilton Function" or "Hamiltonisn". 
Using this function equations (3*2) and (3.26) can be written 
as 
» 
(3.29) = —— (1 = 1,2,...,n) 
9 Pi 
(3.30) p =r.|a— (1 = 1,2,...,n) 
07^  
Equations (3.29) aAd (3.30) are called Hamilton's 
canonical equations. 
From equation (3.30) we note that if the Hamiltonian 
does not depend on a particular state variable the corresponding 
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impulse function (Lagrange multiplier) is constant over time. 
We shall call such a state variable a "cyclic variable" in 
analogy to similar terminology used in classical mechanics. A 
particularly interesting situation arises when the kinematic 
equations (i.e. the differential equations associated with the 
state variables) depend only on the control variables and the 
Hamiltonian does not depend on any state variable. 
Let z(t) be a permissible control vector and let y%(t) 
and pZ(t) be the corresponding response and impulse vectors. 
Let H^ (t) = H(yZ(t), p%(t), z,t). 
We say that the control vector z*(t) satisfies the maiimua 
condition if 
(3.31) H^ *(t) = H(y=*(t), p^ *(t), z*, t) 
= max H^ (t) 
zé.û/ 
2. Pontrvapein's maximum principle (40) 
The optimal control z*(t) which maximizes (3.25) subject 
to the restrictions (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4a) must satisfy the 
maximum condition (3.31). 
Let M = H^ *(t) * H(yZ ,p?*,z*,t). 
Determination of the optimal control vector by Fontryagln's 
principle proceeds in the following stepst 
(1) determine M = max H(yv,p^ ,z,t) 
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(11) solve the folio*ing canonical equations (slEulta-
neously)t 
y = S^EL = 1«_ 
3 pj 
With the initial condition y^ (0) = and 
=-!*_ 
with the boundary conditions 
Pl(T) = c^  . 
3. Dynamic programilng 
The method of dynamic programming can be used if the 
process of economic growth (or evolution) can be described 
as a discrete deterministic process of the Markovian type. 
The process is called discrete if the policy decisions are 
made at discrete intervals of time and the state of the 
system (resulting from these decisions) is observed at the 
same discrete intervals. The process is deterministic if 
given the state of the system at any period and the decision 
taken at that period the state of the system in the next 
period is uniquely determined. A decision inrocess is said 
to be of the Haxkovian type if after any number k of decisions 
the effect on the objective or criterion function of the 
remaining stages of the process depends only on the state of 
the system at the end of the k^  ^decision and on the subsequent 
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decisions. 
Consider the following discrete analogue of the policy 
problem represented by equations (3.1), (3.2), (3*3) and 
(3.4a)t 
T 
(3,1a) maximize W(z) = 23 S. (y(t), z(t), t) 
t=to 
subject to 
(3.2a) yj^ (t) = gj^  (y(t-l), z(t-l), t) (1 == 1,2,...,n) 
with the Initial conditions 
(3.3a) yj^ (o) = y^ ^^  (1 = 1,2,...,n) 
and the constraint 
(3.4b) z é XI 
The vector function g = ^ gjJ can be called the funda­
mental state transition function. The decision problem now 
consists in selecting that sequence z*(0), z*(l),...,z*(T-l) 
of control vectors which maximizes the objective function 
(3.1a) (each of the T control vectors z* should, of course, 
belong to XL )• This choice is quite similar to the choice 
described in Figures 1 and 2 on pages 18 and 22. Barely 
looking at this decision problem it would appear that the 
optimal sequence of control vectors z*(0), z*(l),...,z*(T-l) 
is to be obtained by maximizing (3.1a) simultaneously with 
respect to all terms of the sequence of control variables. 
This bewilderingly large dimension of the problem can be 
reduced by employing the following principle enunciated by 
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Bellman (5) (its analogy to Huygens* principle was noted 
earlier)t 
Principle of optimality An optimal sequence of 
control variables z*(0), z*(l),...,z*(T-l) has the property 
that whatever the initial state and the initial choice 
z*(0) of the control vector may be, the remaining terms of 
the sequence, i.e. z*(l), z*(2),,..,z*(t-l) must constitute 
an optimal sequence with regard to the state y(l) resulting 
from the choice z*(0). 
Let Wj*(yQ) be the value of the objective function W 
when the optimal sequence of controls (T in number) is chosen 
Then we have the following fundamental functional equation 
W* (y ) = max W^ y.) 
T 0 z(0),...,z(T-l) " 
= max  ^ f \ 
z(0),...,z(T-l) Z gQ^ (t),z(t),tj 
= max 
z(0) 
g^ (y(0),z(0),t ) + 13 8n(y(t),z(t),t 
,...,z(T-l)°^  0/ t=l 
= max gQ (yi0),z(0),t \ + max Z Sn(y(t), 
z(0) ° ^ 0/ z(l),...,z(T-l)t=l . 
(t),t) 
(3.32) i.e. W*(y ) = max gn(y(0),z(0),t_) + W* (y(l)) . 
T ® z(0) ° ° T-1 
Noting that 
(3.33) W* (y(0)) = max gf,(y(0),z(0),t.) 
1 z(0) °  ^
we observe that the optimal control can be determined 
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recursively using (3.32) and (3»33)<» This Is the approach of 
dynamic programming. 
E. Optimal Economic Policy Problem as a Mathematical 
Programming Problem 
In ordinary linear programming problems with a finite 
set of variables it is well known that to each such problem 
there corresponds a dual problem. Duffin (14) has defined a 
dual problem for a continuous time allocation problem. 
Following Duffin we shall characterize a dual problem associ­
ated with each linear economic policy problem. 
Let us consider a problem in which the objective function, 
the model, and the restrictions are all linear functions of 
the state and control variables. 
(3.34) Maximize ZI OiY, (T) 
1=1 ^ 
subject to the model 
(3.35) y = A y + B z 
and the constraints 
(3.36) C y + D z ^  a; O'^ Ojz^ O 
where A is n z n matrix B Is an n x m matrix. C is if x n 
matrix and D Is an r-x m matrix. 
The expression (4.1) can be equlvalently written as 
(3.34a) maximize  ^(o,y) dt 
where the expression (o,y) denotes the inner product (scalar 
product) of the vectors c and y. 
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Further we notice that 
 ^(c,y)dt = J (c, A y + B z) dt 
= J (c, A y) dt + J (o,Bz) dt 
and 
(c,Ay) = (A'c.y) 
(c,Bz) = (B*c,z) 
Hence, the problem reduces to 
T. 
maximize 
,y) dt + j (B'c, z) dt I. . .  
subject to 
Î  Dz + C \ (A y + B z) dt^  ^  a - 0 y^  
By Introducing x = (y;z) a vector of dimension n + m the 
problem can be written In a much simpler form. 
3  (3.37) maximize \ (c*, x) dt 
subject to 
(3.38) B* X + J D» X dt^ b* and I ^0 
where 
o* = (A'ciB'c) (a vector of dimension n + m) 
B* = (OÎD) (an r x (n+m) matrix) 
D* = (Caicb) (an r x (n+m) matrix) 
and b* = a - Cyg (a vector of dimension r) 
Let p be a (rxl) vector representing a set of non-negative 
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shadow prices corresponding to the n constraints (3»35)= 
Since p Is a non-negative vector from the Inequality (3.38) 
we must have 
T/ t T/ 
(3.39) \ (P,B* I + D* X dtj dt< \(p,b*) dt 
ov 0 ^ ^ o) 
As It was observed earlier 
T/ / 
(3.40)  ^(p,B*i) dt = P* i) dt 
We shall now show that 
(^p, ^  D* X dt^ ) dt = ^ ( |d** P dt^ ,x) dt 
The formula for integration by parts can be written as 
u^ V* dt = jji VJ ^  - ^ vu* dt 
where prime denotes the time derivative and u and v are any 
arbitrary functions, 
n+m t. 
Let Vj^  = C d*^ j  ^Xj dtj where D* = (df^ j) and 
»1 = ] Pi 
Then 
O.W) ^  (| dt = flj Pj dt)("^  
1 T 
0 
5n+m „ tf S?1 * 1) J =3 "1 " 
Noting that the first term on the right—hand side Is equal 
to zeros we have 
O.^ la) J d'lj ] dtj pjat = I ( |pidti)(^  
The relation 0.41) being true for all 1 = 1,2,—n, we can 
write the following equality In Inner productsi 
T/ tir M Ty T „ 
(3.42) \ (p, 1 D z dt^ ) dt = 1 ( \ p dt^ , D x) dt 
• 3  % # ( ) D • p dt^ , x) dt V 
We can now rewrite the Inequality {3*39) as 
Ta t T TL 
(3.43) \ (p,B* X + I D* X dt^ ) dt = J (B*'p + J D*'pdt^ ,x)dt 
j (p. < \ ,b*)dt 
Consider the sub-class of non-negative vectors p that satisfy 
the constraint 
(3.44) B*' p +  ^D** p dt^  ^  c* 
Then we have the following dual program, dual to the program 
represented by (3»37) and (3*38)i 
T, * 
(3.45) minimize J (p,b ) dt 
subject to 
(3.46) B*' p + D^**pdtj^ c* and p]^  0 
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Prom relations (3*43) and (3*44), we have 
T/ * T, . T , T/ 
(3.47) [ (p,b )dt^ Ç (B*p + ^ D p dt^ , x) dt^ (^c*,x 
Theorem 3.1 
If i®and p® are two feasible vectors satisfying the 
Inequalities (3.38) and (3,46) such that 
T T/ m 
(3.48)  ^(c*, X®) dt =  ^(b*, p ) dt 
then X® Is an optimal solution for the primal problem (3.37) 
and (3.38) and p® Is an optimal solution of the dual problem 
(3.45) and (3.46) . 
Proof; 
Let z be any other feasible solution of the primal 
problem. Then from relations (3.47) and (3.48) we have 
(3.49)  ^(c*,x) dt ^  ^ (b*, p®) dt = (c*, X®) dt 
showing that x^  Is an optimal solution for the primal problem 
A similar and symmetrical argument shows that p^  is an 
optimal solution of the dual problem. Let us consider the 
following Lagranglan forms corresponding to the primal and 
dual problems;^  
(3.50) <^ (x,p) = ^ (®*» i) dt + ^ (b* - B*x-^ D*xdt^ , p) dt 
(Primal Lagranglan) 
T^he Lagranglan of the dual (3.51) Is similar to (3.50) 
obtained by converting the minimum problem Into a maximum 
problem by the appropriate changes of signs in the parameters 
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\dt (3.51)^ (p,2:) = (b*, p)dt (b** p D** p dt^  -
(Dual Lagranglan) 
It can be easily seen from the preceding results that 
$(x,p) = -•^ (p,i) 
± Theorem 3.2 
If X® and p® are two feasible solutions of the primal 
and dual programs respectively, satisfying the following (Kuhn-
Tucker, 28) conditions 
fl n+m _  ^ t n+m  ^ * 
(3.52) p, = 0 If E b  ^g 
(l — 1,2, —- r) 
and 
(3.53) xj = 0 If g + J ^  > 0* 
(3 = 1,2, m + n) 
then X® Is an optimal solution of the primal problem and p® 
is sun optimal solution of the dual problem. 
Prooft 
If I® and p® satisfy the above (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions. 
It is evident from (3*50) and (3.51) that 
<5(x®, jP) =  ^(o*, X®) dt 
C^losely related and somewhat more general results were 
obtained by Hurwloz (22) employing advanced topological concepts. 
I am grateful to Professor Kenneth Arrow of Stanford University 
for drawing my attention to this work. 
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sind 
 ^(b*, p®) dt . 
Since 
$(x^ ,p®) = X®) we have 
T/ T/ 
(^c*, X®) dt =  ^(b*, p®) dt. 
Using Theorem 3.1 we observe that x® is an optimal solution 
of the primal problem and jP is an optimal solution of the 
dual problem. 
Given an economic policy (i.e., the time paths of the 
control variables and their responses that constitute the 
vector x) we can say whether it is optimal or not by finding 
if there exists a set of shadow prices (which are functions of 
time) that satisfy the conditions of Theorem 3.2. The inter­
pretation of conditions (3»52) and (3*53) is analogous to the 
interpretation given to similar conditions in static models. 
However, in dynamic models of optimization we have inter­
temporal efficiency conditions such as, for example, that the 
value of the capital stock in period t should equal (under 
optimal conditions) the sum of rentals on it from t on. 
Srinivasan (46) gives a simileur interpretation (of the inter­
temporal efficiency type) to the dual variables in a dynamic 
programming formulation of a two-sector model of growth. 
As an illustration of the programming formulation of a 
policy problem let us consider the following specific examplet 
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Maximize ï(T), the terminal income, subject to Phillips* 
model for a closed economy which can be written In Allen's 
notations as (2, p. 269)% 
(3.54) Y = - A/Sï + A(G + I) 
and the constraints 
(3.55) 
(3.56) G^ rY ; 0<T<1 
(3.57) I ^  IQ 
(3.58) I ^  o(Y ; 0<<<1 
(3.59) i ^  ,3 
(3.60) Ï > 0; Ï > 0 . 
Condition (3.55) states that in each year the goremment 
expenditure has to at least equal Gq, the expenditure needed 
to provide the nation with the essential services. Condition 
(3.56) states that it is limited further in each year by the 
government receipts (say, throu^  taxes,TY, where T is the 
tax rate). Condition (3.57) states that in each year invest­
ment must at least equal a minimum level 1^ , that could be, 
for exaiq>le, the investment needed to keep the capital stock 
intact. Condition (3.58) states that investment is limited 
further by the availability of funds (say throu^  savings of 
individuals, c< Y, whereX is the personal saving rate). 
CanditioQ (3.59) specifies a minimum rate of growth . This 
problem can be written in the framework given above as 
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T, 
(3.37) Maslmlze C (c*, z) dt 
0) 
subject to 
(3.38) B*x +  ^3D*x dt ^  b* 
where 
X = (Y G I); c* = "X A) 
(3.61) B* = 0 1 0 ; D* = - ra _ ta 
0 -1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 _«<a _ 
0 0 -1 0 0 0 
j a( ^ +a/s ) 
and b* = rïQ — 
-^ 0 
-lo 
-(p + av$)YQ 
Since the valuation coefficients (c^ ) corresponding to G and I 
are positive It Is evident that G and I must satisfy the 
constraints (3.56) and (3*58) with equality at the terminal 
time. Further assuming that the constraint (3*59) is not 
t 
binding (i.e. ï when the constraints (3.56) and (3»58) 
are binding we can write the corresponding 'basic* equations 
as follows I 
(3.62) fo 1 oWy\ vra>?.-ta \ /ï\ 
[o 0 ij _ d:a/ (sj " 
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Denoting the dual variables corresponding to the five 
constraints In (3.61) by Pj^ (t), pgft), p^ (t), P2^ (t) and p^ (t) 
respectively, the dual program corresponding to (3»62) can be 
written as followsi 
Equations (3.63) and (3.64) give the intertemporal effi­
ciency conditions that can be interpreted as followst A is 
the valuation attached to a unit of G at the terminal time. A 
unit of G contributes A units of (increase in) output. 
Similarly a unit of I also contributes A units of (increase in) 
output. Out of A units of increase in output f A units are 
spent again as government ex]penditure and units are spent 
again as investment. Thus the coefficients TA and of A are 
analogous to the "reinvestment coefficient" of Galenson and 
Leibenstein (19). Equations (3.63) and (3.64) state that given 
These equations (3.62a) give the following simultaneous 
equations in p^  and p^  
(-fApj +^ Ap^ )dt = A 
C^ Pl +':(Ap^ ) At = A . 
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G >0 and I > 0 at time t the unit values attached to them 
(shadow prices) p^ (t) and p^ (t) are such that they are equal 
to the value of future government expenditure and investment 
generated by them from t on. 
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IV. DEVELOPMENT POLICY MODELS AND INVESTMENT PLANNING 
A. A Review of Development Policy Models 
The need for analytic methods In solving dynamic economic 
policy models becomes evident as we survey the existing 
literature on investment planning for development. Widely 
differing proposals leading to widely different choices, from 
the most capital intensive to the most labor intensive tech­
niques of production, have been put forward. In general, a 
complete analysis of investment planning requires criteria of 
choice between alternative projects at each of several discrete 
phases of planning taking due account of demand and supply 
restrictions of both factors and products imposed by the 
economy. We shall briefly comment on some of the recent 
important contributions in this area. 
Buchanan (8) and Polak (38) put forward the proposal 
that investment be concentrated in capital-light projects, 
i.e. projects that yield a high value of annual product per 
unit of investment. This is apparently the conclusion one 
would arrive at with the objective of maximizing the output 
subject to a capital constraint (this could include a con­
straint on the foreign inflow of capital). 
Kahn (25) criticizes the Buchanan-Polak criterion on 
the grounds that the resulting choice does not necessarily 
yield the highest "social product". In other words, Kahn was 
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implicitly assuming a social welfare function that is a 
monotonlcally increasing function of what may be called a 
"social product" which is not necessarily the simple algebraic 
sum of the yields of various projects. This point was made 
more explicit by Chenery (10) who postulates the existence of 
a social welfare function which is, in general, a function of 
an Indefinite number of variables of which according to 
Chenery national Income, balance of payments and distribution 
of Income are most Important. The operational procedure 
suggested by Chenery is to rank projects according to their 
social marginal productivity (SMP) and choose projects in 
decreasing order of SMP until the given rate of Investment is 
exhausted* Chenery defines the SMP of a project as the 
average annual increment in national Income (plus balance-of-
payments effect) resulting from the marginal unit of invest­
ment in that project. Kahn and Chenery emphasize that the 
Increment in national Income is to be computed after correcting 
the market prices for divergencies between private and social 
benefits (and costs) that occur when external economies, 
unused resources, tariffs and subsidies are present. 
The Kahn-Chenery approach is static since the choice Is 
made only once taking into account the effect of the choice 
on the "social product". The choice of techniques or projects 
is made complex due to the fact that any particular choice has 
to be evaluated by the value of output (or social product) It 
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yields during the entire lifetime of the project. Although 
Kahn suid Chenery emphasize the need to correct market prices 
to obtain social costs they do not attempt to show how the 
(future) market prices are themselves determined. These 
authors are perhaps implicitly assuming (a) that the planning 
authority can project the future market prices accurately, or 
that (b) the future course of market prices is independent of 
the current choice or (at the least) (c) that the intended 
investment is too small to affect the future course of 
market prices. In a national economy undertaking long term 
perspective planning with big investment projects to transform 
the economy from a low productivity state to a desired high 
productivity state none of the above assumptions are reason­
able. 
In evaluating the value of the income stream (or the 
value of social product) generated by any project the planners 
need to know the future product and factor prices. The future 
product and factor prices depend on the future demand and 
supply relations for both products and factors which in turn 
depend on the current level and allocation of investment. 
This bilateral dependence between choice variables and the 
future unit values is the most crucial aspect of investment 
planning.. 
Galenson and Leibensteln (19) criticize the Kahn-Chenery 
approach for neglecting the Intertemporal valuation of income 
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streams. They mention that "the valuation of capital goods 
depend on the value (emphasis mine) of output stream generated 
by an Increment of capital projected into the indefinite 
future" (19, p. 344). They recognize the importance of 
reinvestment generated by each of the investment projects and 
the dependence of labor productivities of different projects 
on the rate of growth of population and the level of skills 
of the labor force. They do not, however, treat the question 
of evaluating the different income streams generated by 
different projects. The social welfare function they propose 
is an increasing function of per capita output at a given 
future point in time. According to the Galenson-Leibensteln 
thesis "the best allocation of Investment of resources is 
achieved by equating the marginal per capita reinvestment 
coefficient of capital in its various alternative uses" 
(19, p, 351), The marginal per capita reinvestment coefficient 
of any project is determined by the annual surplus generated 
by a marginal unit of Investment in that project over and 
above wage and depreciation costs, taking Into account the 
contribution of the project toward Improving the quality of 
the labor force and bringing about a decline in Its rate of 
growth. The Galenson-Leibensteln approach Is also static in 
the sense that the decision is made only once taking Into 
account its dynamic Impacts into the future. 
The literature reviewed so far clearly indicates that 
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different authors proposed different criteria for the choice 
of techniques because (i) they have assumed different social 
welfare functions, and/or (ii) they have assumed different 
constraints euid/or (iii) they have assumed different underlying 
models of growth. Recognizing these elements of specifying a 
policy problem Eckstein (1?) tries to synthesize the Kahn-
Chenery approach and the Galehson-Leibenstein approach by 
formulating the decision problem as a problem of constrained 
laaiima. The social welfare function considered by Eckstein 
is the present value of the future consumption stream resulting 
from a given current investment K and the future reinvestment 
occassioned by it. Current investment is to be divided among 
alternative projects which differ in their productivities and 
reinvestment potential. While he assumes that the planning 
authority expresses the collective Judgement about the 
society's time preferency by means of the (long term) interest 
rate he does not consider the effect of the present choice of 
technique on the long term interest rate. On the other hand 
he states that his HGC criterion Is extremely sensitive to 
changes in the Interest rate. His approach is also not 
essentially dyneunlc since the choice is made only once as he 
assumes that all reinvestments are to be directed to a single 
project. The maximization of the Lagranglan corresponding to 
the problem of constrained maxima yields his HGC (marginal 
growth contribution) criterion. The optimal allocation of 
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Investment between alternative projects is achieved by-
equating the MGC of capital in its various alternative uses, 
"If undertaking the project is an all-or-nothing choice, then 
the marginal condition becomes an inequality. A project 
should be undertaken if its MGC is greater thanyW.. The value 
of jl/* is discovered by ranking all projects by their MGC euid 
allocating the available capital to the best projects." 
(17, p. 69) 
Following the contribution by Malinvaud (35) Srinivasan 
(45) presents, for the first time in the literature on the 
choice of techniques, the connection between the theory of 
accumulation of capital and the theory of choice of techniques. 
We shall have an occassion to refer to Srinivasan*s work at 
the end of this chapter. 
We shall now treat a problem of investment planning that 
is truly dynamic in the sense that there is a choice to be 
made at each instant during the planning horizon. The 
analytical techniques proposed in the preceding chapter can 
be illustrated by considering the problem of optimal allocation 
of Investment between regions (or sectors). 
B. Models of Regional Allocation of Investment 
Rahman (41) has investigated the problem of optimal 
allocation of Investment between two regions that sure 
characterized by differing productivities and saving rates. 
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Intrlllgator (23) has formulated Rahman's problem as a 
control problem that can be solved using Pontryagln's maximum 
principle. However, the solutions of Heunllton's canonical 
equations given by Intrlllgator were In error and consequently 
his results were not correct.^  Further, he did not attempt 
to prove all the five propositions given by Hahman. For this 
reason we shall consider Intrlllgator*s formulation of 
Hahman*s problem and prove In a much simpler way all the five 
propositions that were given by Rahman. 
Consider the national Income y (In a two-region economy) 
as the simple sum of the regional Incomes* 
(4.1) y = y^  + yg 
Let the production functions In the two regions be of the 
simplest kind 
(4.2) kj Ayj " 1]^  
Kg Ayj = I2 
where and k^  are the Incremental capital output ratios. 
If -z. Is the proportion of total Investment I = I^  + I^  that 
Is allocated to region 1 we have 
(4.3) ki y^  = 2 1 
kg Ayg = (1 -z.) I 
(4.4) But, 1 = 3=/^  ^y^ +^z^ g 2^ 
I^ wish to thank Dr. Intrlllgator for a private commnl-
catlon on this point. 
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Taking the continuous time version of the increments we can 
write our basic kinetic equations for the economy as 
(4.5) y. = %( y, + yJ 
1^ *1 
yg = (1 - X ) ( y^  + yg) 
2^ kg 
Considering Bahmari*s objective of maximizing national income 
at the terminal time of a pre-assigned planning horizon we 
can formulate the complete policy problem as follows 
maximize y = yj(r)»- yg (T) 
subject to 
(4.5) y. = 2" ( ^ y^ + yg) 
kl 1. kl 
y, = (1 - as) (-^— y- + y^) 
:2 kg '2 '1 k. '2' 
(4.6) 7^ (0) = ; yg (0) = ygg 
(4.7) and 0^  Xé. 1 
The Hamiltonian of the problem can be written as 
(4.8) H = P Z(-dl_ y + y ) + p (1 - %) 
( A. + a_,, 
"2 1^ 2 
W^e neglect the regional constraints involving tolerance 
limits for the disparity in regional incomes. These constraints 
were left out of consideration by Intriligator also. We 
indicated how these constraints can be taken into account in a 
linear control problem, that can be solved using the maximum 
principle. 
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(,^ .9) ^  (^ 1 yj + 2^ 7^ 
Assiming that there Is no dissaving in the economy the optimal 
policy iB given by 
(4.10) *^ = f 1 If ^  > _ 
kg 
0 otherwise 
The impulse functions or shadow prices satisfy the following 
differsntial equations 
(4.11, . -|â-= + 
^ 1 L ' 1=1 kg / kgj 
(4.12) Pg = - - -<2 1^("^ " "^) * ^ 
2 9,2 l "l ''Z ''zj 
with the terminal conditions 
(4.13) Pi (T) = 1 ; and Pg (T) = 1 
Equations (4.11), (4.12), and (4.13) can be recognized 
as the Intertemporal efficiency conditions of the same type 
as conditions (3»52) and (3*53)• (4.13) states that the 
valuation attached to a unit of yi (or yg) at the terminal 
time t = T is unity. This is so because the objective 
function gives unit weights to yi and y^  at the terminal time. 
(4.11) and (4.13) can be written in the following form: 
(4.11a) Pi (t) = Pi(T) + % Pi + (1 -Sc) Pg dt 
t^  ki - k 2 
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(4.12a) p, (t) = p, (T) + '"(  ^XV, + — (1 P, at 
2 2 k% 1 kg " 
Prom the kinetic equations (4.5) we observe that a marginal 
Increase cf one unit In y, contributes to % —-i- units of 
. 
Increase In y. and (1 - * ) ——^  units of Increase In y^ , 
1 kg 
which explains the Intertemporal efficiency condition (4.11a). 
A similar explanation can be given to the condition (4.12a). 
The optimal policy for the terminal or end period Is 
obvious from these terminal conditions 
(4.14) z* (T) = 1 If 1 N, 1 
k/ kg 
I.e. the region with the greater output - capital ratio 
Is favored In the terminal period. Without loss of any 
generality we cam assume that 1, > jL (we label the region 
with greater output-capital ratio or smaller k as region 1). 
Under the control 2? = 1 the above differential equations 
for Pj^  and p^  take the form 
r 
(4.11b) Pi = - 1 p^  with p^  (T) = 1 
4 
(4.12b) Ps = -  ^p., with p^  (T) = 1 
'l 
k. 1 "2 
whose solutions are ^ Iven by 
and 
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* — e 4 
Now we shall prove Rahman's five propositions! 
Proposition It The optimal plan Is such that the Investment 
In any period Is dumped In one region. 
Rahman's proposition Is more general and shows that at 
any Instant the optimal position lies at an extreme point -
a well-known result In programs with linear Inequalities. 
The particular characterization considered above neglects the 
tolerance limits for the allowable disparity between the 
regional Incomes and also the capacity limitations for each 
region. If ve Include these items by means of additional 
linear inequalities, in general we do not dump the investment 
in only one region for optimal allocation. Instead of the 
constraints z= o and =^1 being the binding constraints 
we may have other constraints that make a proper division of 
Investment between the two regions. This point will be 
explained in more detail later and illustrated with a 
numerical example. 
Theoretically it provides no new complexities and any 
additional linear inequalities can be taken into account in 
the frame work presented in the last section of the previous 
chapter (i.e.) a programming formulation of the optimal 
economic policy problem. 
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The proof of Proposition 1 Is trivial from the optimal 
decision rule 
(4.10) If P^  > 2^ 
*2 
otherwise 
and the auxiliary equation for p^  and Pg 
(4.11) = — ^ 1 P2 
*2 
(4.12) p = -^ 
Proposition 2t 
Zf^i 
PJ(T)=l 
; Pg (T) = 1 
the optimum program If -«1 
kg 
favors the more productive region. 
Proof I We assumed, without loss of generality, that 1 \ 1 
1^ 2^ 
and hence at the terminal time the region 1 is favored. In 
order that this region be favored throughout the plan period 
we require (from 4.10) p^   ^Pg throughout the plan 
1^ *2 
period. From equations (4.11a), (4.12a) we have 
!i = 1 
h/. (T-t) 
e > • 
+ 1 i 1 -
k2 
^2 
(T-t) 
1^ 
= _f2 
2^ 
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(4.17) & 
-e K 
(T-t) 1 - \ 1 
4 4- "3Î > & 
since  ^/ (T-t) 
> 1 for all t < T 
and since 1x1 the above Inequality Is true If 1 ~ ^ 2 
Si > *2 " " ki kg 
i.e. if A. > iâ. 
Proposition 3t In order that the optimum program may favor 
the less productive region, region 2, In any year at ell, 
<<2 \ 
"2  ^"l 
The proof of this proposition follows as an Immediate 
consequence of the above Inequality (4.17). 
Proposition 4t If in any particular year the optimum position 
favors the less productive region then in all earlier years, 
if any, the_same region must be favored. 
Proof: Suppose for t = f the less productive region, region 
2, is favored. Then we must have 
Pi (r)  ^PgCr) 
kg 
i.e. 4 (T-T ) 
< ^ il" 
1 
Cl 
(T-t) 
+ 
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I.e. 4 (T -T) 
£ (l - ^2 < 1 (l ' 
~^2 K IT^ 
I.e. |l (T-r) / » _ , \ ^  , /A 
 ^"l ( -?2 — 1 ^  > 1 ^ -^2 - l) \ % a J kg y 
(using proposition 3) 
1^ (T - t) il_ (T -r) 
> -e 
Since * k, x.  ^k. for any t: <L ^  
We have for any (r < T 
él_ (T -t) 
 ^k. (&i (|-"') 
I.e. Pj^ (fc)  ^ Pg (t) for t < T 
k^  2^ 
Q* E« D« 
Proposition 5t Given 2^  ^ and a plan period 
kg %! 
sufficiently large, the optimum program must favor the less 
productive region in a number of initial years. 
Proof! To prove this proposition, we will find if there exists 
a T such that pg^  (T) _ PgCT) , a point where the 
ki kg 
switching of the program occurs. 
-h (T-r) -  ^(T-r) 
Pl(T)  ^ 1  ^ kj and Pg(r) , 1  ^^ 
— " V 
+ 1 (1 - |z_ ) 
kg 
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Pj^ (r) = PgÇT) 
implies that 
& (T - r) 
1_ € %! 
*1 
i.e.  ^(T -T) 
^ K 
(T - T) 
i.e.  ^k, 
-e 1 
k. 
 ^(T -f) 
= 3^ . 2^ 6 %! 
kg fe (*• 5 
(k't +J ' k (''  t  
1^ - ^ \= / A - ^ 2 1 
k^i k^ r \ kg / 
2^ \ Since -^^ 1 
"2 
• (T -T) 
and 1 -s. 1 
1 "2 
k^  ^  k„ we must have /$£ 
^^1 
Taking logarithms on both sides we have 
(/& -4) / kr 
_(T -T) = log 
'1 4 /kg - '^ /kj 
(The logarithm on the right hand-side is meaningful and 
exists because of the assumption that/^ o, \/Si , 1 
4, '"i' 
T - f = kjL log 
Ti, 
K&Z - / kg 
-^ /ki' 
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T T - log {^ 2-^ 1) /k 2 
Thus we have the general result which says that 
2 
There exists a 
switching point T' 
Q* S» D* 
Some of these propositions will be clear if we plot the 
as shown in Figure 3* 
As an illustration of the logic mentioned above we 
consider the following more meaningful and operational 
problemt 
Consider an underdeveloped economy which has just emerged 
as a democratic nation eind which undertakes an investment plan 
for a planning horizon of 15 years (say three 5 year plans). 
In such on economy we can consider Colin Clark's (11) 
classification of industries into three sectors, primary, 
secondary and tertiary. The primary sector consists mainly 
of agriculture eind household or cottage industries, the 
secondary sector consists of medium scale and large scale 
manufacturing industries, and the tertiary sector consists 
mainly of the professional services and public services 
variables p^ (t)/k^  = Pj(t) and P2(t)/k2 = p^ ft) against time 
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Time 
Figure 3 ; Time paths of the shadow prices under optimal 
decisions 
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Including the bottleneck industries such as transportation. 
Such an economy may be assumed to have the following struc­
ture»^  
Capital-output Hate of (reinvest-
ratio ible) saving 
Sector 1, Primary 1.5 5% 
Sector 2, Secondary 3.0 30# 
Sector 3, fertiary 2.5 15# 
The rate of savings structure implies an assumption as 
to the distribution of value added by factor shares. The 
rate of savings of 30# in the secondary sector could mean 
that about 30# of the value added in the secondary industries 
goes as the share of entrepreneurship (profit) that can be 
reinvested either in that sector alone or in all the three 
sectors. 
The Investment policy problem can be formulated as 
maximize i^^ lT =  ^o^ b^  K 
dubject to 
 ^ lt+1 " '^ iVlt t^ 
(^ it+1 - Kit) 0(i 
(^ it+i " %!%) for t = 0,1; —; T-1 
T^he coefficients in the model presented here are simply 
notional. However, they may ht least have meaningful dlmensloMS 
for the type of economy under consideration. These figures are 
assumed only to Illustrate the logic of the problem and they 
should not be taken seriously as representing any country. 
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where the are the coefficients representing the valuation 
attached by the policy maker to the values added In the three 
sectors; the b^  ^are the output-capital-ratios ; the 
stock of capital in Industry 1 at period t; is the net 
foreign capital Inflow in period t; smd the  ^are the 
minimum stipulated proportions of total investment that should 
go Into each of ths three sectors. We are assuming that the 
production functions in the three sectors are of the simplest 
kind yjt = 
This problem can be solved by dynamic programming as 
suggested by Dorfman (13). It is evident that investment in 
the last period should favor that sector for which b^ c^  Is 
maximum. Suppose sector 1 is favored in the last period. 
Noting that W = ®i ^ iT ~ ^  ^1 ®i ^ lT-1 1^ ®i 
1=1 1=1 
We have 
- ^ iT-1^ * 
max W = max = max ^ b^  Cj^  
b^ c^  + ^2^ 2®2 *'^ 3^ 3®3 ' Ç^ I'^ AT-I 
+ 
3 
+ * T-l' 
= max Ib.c. + (1-T-1 
+ (^ 2®2 2^^ 2°2^ 2^ 2 ^  2^ T-1 * 
(b3®3 + ^3^ 3®3^ 3 3^^  3^ T-1 
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Let o^ ) T = *1 
<Vl) T-l = + "-«'2- "^ 3' 1^ -^ 1 
(tzOg) T-l = <V2'l * '^ z^ z'^ z <V2> T 
t V3' T-l ° * "^ 3^ 3 "^ 3 'V3' T 
In the next-to-last period the region with maximum (b^ o^ ) 
Is favored. As long as region 1 Is preferred the valuation 
coefficients (b^ Cj^ )^  satisfy the recurrence relations 
'^ l®lH-l = (Vl't * <l-'^ 2-S' 'Vl>t h -^ 1 
(V2>t-1 = <V2't + '^ 2^ 2'^ 2 (t2°2) t 
^Vs't-i ° ^Vs't + 'V3't 
Similar recurrence relations with due alternations hold when 
a different sector Is favored. Given the following values 
for the coefficients In the model the valuation variables for 
the three sectors follow the pattern shown In Table li 
tl 1^ 1^ ®1 
Sector 1, primary 0.67 0.05 0.10 3 
Sector 2, secondary 0.33 0.30 0.40 5 
Sector 3, tertiary 0.40 0.15 0.30 4 
Table 1 demonstrates that sector 1 Is to be favored towards 
the end of the plan due to the higher valuation 
attached to It In the (terminal) objective function, and 
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Table 1. The pattern of valuation variables In a three 
sector Investment allocation model 
Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 
Year Primary Secondary Tertiary 
T 2.0100 1.6500 1.6000 
T-1 2.0301 1.7153 1.6288 
T-2 2.0504 1.7832 1.6581 
T-3 2.0709 1.8538 1.6879 
T-4 2.0916 1.9276 1.7183 
T-5 2.1125 2.0039 1.7492 
T-6 2.1336 2.0832 1.7807 
T-7 2.1549 2.1657 1.8128 
T-8 2.1622 2.2943 1.8455 
T-9 2.1696 2.4306 1.8787 
T-10 2.1770 2.5750 1.9125 
T-11 2.1844 2.7269 1.9469 
T-12 2.1918 2.8889 1.9819 
T-13 2.1992 3.0605 2.0176 
T-14 2.2067 3.2423 2.0539 
T-15 2.2142 3.4349 2.0905 
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sector 2 with higher output-capital ratio Is to be preferred 
for the first 8 years with a switch occurring at the 9th year. 
It is quite clear that the recurrence relations between 
the valuation variables and  ^are analogous 
to the differential equations satisfied by the shadow prices 
or Impulse functions of Rahman's problem dealt with above. 
C. A Two-Sector Model of Growth 
The problems of regional allocation of Investment and 
the choice of techniques or projects have the same logical 
structure and hence the methods developed so far for Rahman's 
problem can be applied to the problem of choice of techniques. 
The above analysis can be extended to more than two regions. 
When we consider a finely disaggregated model with several 
regions we should take into account the capacity limitations. 
Each region could have at most only a fraction of the total 
investment and the Investment in each region should have a 
floor. Such a general formulation of the problem can be 
solved by considering the nonlinear extension of the general­
ized Kuhn-Tucker conditions (3*52) and (3*53)• 
The production functions underlying Rahman's model are 
of the simplest kind. Rahman considers linear homogeneous 
production functions of degree 1 with capital as the only 
input. The production functions in the two-sector model 
Investigated by Srlnivasan (46) are more general. 
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Consider Srinlvasan's two-sector model. There are two 
sectors in the economy; sector 1 produces a homogeneous 
capital good and sector 2 produces a homogeneous consumer 
good. There are two homogeneous factors of production, labor 
and capital. Let P ^  (K^ , be the production function of 
sector i (i = 1,2) where is the capital input and is 
the labor input in sector i. Assume that the output of the 
consumer good at any point in time is instantaneously consumed, 
and the output of the capital good sector is used (a) for 
replacement of depreciated capital and (b) as an addition to 
the existing capital stock. Let us assume for simplicity 
that there are no structural constraints for allocating the 
addition to capital stock between the two sectors (i.e. we 
admit the possibility of channelling the addition to capital 
stock in any period to only one of the two sectors). Let us 
assume that the labor force grows exponentially at a positive 
rate 0, and that the capital is depreciated following an 
exponential decay with parameter h . Capital once installed 
in a sector la assumed to be not transferable to the other 
sector, and it is assumed that labor can be freely transferred 
from one sector to the other. Let us consider the social 
welfare function to be a monotonically increasing function 
of the terminal value of the capital stock per unit labor. 
We can now write the policy problem asi 
75 
(4.18) maximize K^ (T) + KgCT) 
subject to the model 
(4.19) Qi = (K^ .Li) 
(4.20) Qg = (Kg, Lg) 
# 
(4.21) + Kg +%K2 
0t (4.22) Li + LgfC L = 0 
where and Qg are outputs of the capital good sector and 
consumer good sector respectively. 
Let us define the following state and control variables.^  
State variables» = K^  
L 
2^ = *2 
L 
# 
Control variables t = K^  +9lK^  
=2 = 
L 
Let us assume (as Srinivasan does) that the production 
1 2 functions P-*- and P are homogeneous of degree 1 (not necessarily 
linear as in Rahman's model). Then we have 
A^n analogous treatment can be found in a recent paper 
by Mordecai Kurz (29). 
y, = 
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^ (K^) = L = Kj - L K 1 
L 17 Kj L 
- 21 
L L 
# 
= K, 
- "i -
d (K.) = K_ - K_ L = Ko K, - L K. 
dt-^ -^_4 — ^ 
L L Ko L L L 
= f2_ 2^ -0^2 
K. = Zi (Kl, Lj) - %%! 
Zi K^ F ^  ( '^ îa) " h K, 
or Kl = %! F 
' ('• ? t) - 97 
Ko = 
# 
K 
K, 
2 
= pl (l, - % 
= %! Zp ( yi u - ^  
^ 4* ; 
(1 - Zj) F^  (Kl, Lj) -^ iKg 
(1 - Zj) Kl pi (l. -^Kg 
(1 - zj) Kj Zg pi (y , l) -
li  ^ V ; 
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Then Zg , l) " { 6 + h % ' 
Yg = (1 - z^ ) ^ 2 t  ^  ^  ^) ^2 
The two sector policy model described above can be stated as 
follows8 
(4.23) maximize y^  (T) + y^  (T) 
subject to the "kinetic equations" 
yi = Zg P' 
(4.24) 
y« = (1 - z 
^  ^  ^) ?! 
l' =2 1^ 1 , ij - ( 6 + 32 
The Hamiltonian corresponding to thl& problem can be written as 
(4.25) H = Pj =2 F ^ |yj - ( 0 + % ) ?! 
+ Pc (1 - Z^ ) Zg P ^ ^ , ^ - ' • 0 * 9 1 )  7 2  
= (Pl - Pg) Zg pi , ij 
Assuming that production is impossible with only one of the 
two factors we must stipulate that Zg = 0 implies z^  = 0. 
For Zg > 0 the optimal strategy at any time for investment 
allocation can be specified using the maximum principle as: 
(t) = 1 if Pi(t) > P2(t) 
0 if Pj^ (t) < P2(t) 
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The differential equations satisfied by the shadow prices 
p^ (t) and pgft), or the intertemporal efficiency conditions 
can be obtained once the actual forms of the production 
functions are known. 
Somewhat more realistic policy problems should have 
different constraints operating at different instants. 
Srinivasan assumes that the consumer good produced is 
instantly consumed. It is more meaningful to relax this type 
of knife-edge equilibrium in the economy ana Introduce dynamic 
equations of market adjustments. Further it is necessary to 
specify how the future demand for consumer goods is determined. 
While investigating long term policy problems it is also 
desirable to introduce Improvement in technology and changes 
In tastes as entering Into the demand-supply equations of the 
model. The above specification of a two sector model Is not 
complete and it will have more operational significance if 
the demand for consumer goods and the market adjustments are 
also specified. 
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V. STABILIZATION AND ADAPTIVE OPTIMIZATION IN 
ECONOMIC POLICY MODELS 
A. Phillips* Stabilization Policy and 
Automatic Control Processes 
Our discussion of policy problems so far has been 
focussed on models of economic growth and development. The 
mathematical structure of policy problems presented in Chapter 
3 is much more general. In this chapter ;*e shall present a 
few concepts and methods that are useful in applying the 
control theory approach to problems of stabilization that 
interest policy makers in advanced economies. 
The first and most interesting quantitative model of 
stabilization policy was presented by Phillips (37)» The 
problem can be described as follows x 
Suppose y = o is an equilibrium or desired level of out­
put ruling up to t = o and that demand then falls suddenly by 
a given amount resulting in demand supply disequilibrium. If 
the economy is left to Itself the dynamic phenomenon resulting 
from the disequilibrium will generate undesired fluctuations 
in output and/or the economy can not regain the equilibrium 
level of output. The task of stabilization policy is to 
devise a regulating mechanism which will (i) restore the 
equilibrium and (ii) dampen the fluctuations. Although 
Phillips recognized these two desiderata he did not explicitly 
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quantify the objective function of stabilization policy. 
This omission leaves unsolved a number of interesting problems 
which we will indicate later in this chapter. 
In the 1940*8 electrical engineers had designed (as a 
result of continued experimentation) a regulating mechanism 
of the feedback type to dampen fluctuations and to restore 
steady-state behavior in electrical circuits (or networks). 
Taking his stimulus from these developments in electrical 
engineering, Phillips came out with the proposal of creating 
an additional "official demand" over and above the existing 
consumption and investment demands of the economy. The 
appropriate level of this "official demand" at any instant 
should depend according to Phillips on (1) the actual 
deviation of the output at that Instant from the equilibrium 
output and/or (11) the cumulative deviations of actual output 
from the equilibrium output from the initial time t = o to 
that instant, and/or (ill) the time rate (at that instant) 
of change of the deviation of actual output from the equilib­
rium level. (It would presumably be the responsibility of 
government fiscal and monetary authorities to see that this 
"official demand" followed the time path required by the 
policy rule adopted). 
Phillips* stabilization model is a member of a much wider 
class of automatic control processes first investigated by a 
Russian mathematician Lure in 1951 (34) and later in I96I by 
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Letov (33) and LaSalle and Lefschetz (31). The class of 
automatic control processes considered by the above authors 
can be represented by the following system of differential 
equations : 
(5.1) y = Ay + b ^ (z) 
(5.2) z = c^ y - r j^ (z) 
where y is the state variable (n x 1 vector), A is an n i n 
(real numbers). The function ;f(z) in equations (5.1) and 
(5.2) is any continuous function (linear or nonlinear that 
satisfies the following condition; 
(5.3) 2 f (z) > o for z ^  o 
where z and;^ (z) are known in feed back control theory as the 
signal and the characteristic function of the servomechanism 
respectively. 
Let y be the deviation of the output Y from the equilib­
rium level Y and z be the official demand created by the 
government in a Stabilization Model. Phillips distinguishes 
the following types of planned official demandsi 
(i) z = - p y (proportional policy) 
(iii) z = - y (derivative policy) 
Where -f , -Ç , cmd 4, are constants or parameters of the policy. 
matrix, b and c are n z 1 vectors, z, jr(z) and r are scalars 
(integral policy) 
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A combination of all the three policies is called a mixed 
policy* 
(5.4) z = - ( Jp y + ji y) 
The Phillips Model can be represented by the following 
equationI 
(5.5) y = - y + Az 
Where X is the speed of supply response which is assumed to 
be of continuous exponential form; 4 is the marginal propensity 
to save. ^ Without any loss of generality we assume that the 
autonomous expenditure is zero. Taking the mixed policy of 
the above for-ûi (5*4) and using the model equation (5.5) we 
can write 
z = (- A4y + Az) - y - fd (- A/$y + Az) 
= "ifp A^y + Az) - y + A'5(- A'5 y + Az) 
- A fa z 
(1 +A = 
or 
(5.6) z = /Cy - Vz 
y - fp -
Where li = , andT)' ^ < ifp" ^ ^^1) 
1+Afa 
Clearly equations (5.5) and (5.6) are of the same form as 
equations (5*1) and (5.2), 
Phillips was concerned with choosing the best policy from 
P^or a detailed account of Phillips Model see E.G.D. Allen 
(2). 
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1 
a class of linear additive mixed policies. As Phillips did 
not consider expllclty any performance measure or objective 
function we do not know If his Stabilization policy has any 
optlmallty characteristics. In particular, the cost or 
disutility associated with the level of official demand 
required to stabilize the level of output was not taken into 
account in Phillips* approach. In the electrical engineering 
literature of more recent years we can find a criterion 
function or performance index that is an "integrated error" 
of the following type; 
Where the first and second components of the integrand can be 
regarded as (i) the cost of the deviations in output, and (11) 
the cost of using the control. 
Recently Kalman and Bertram (26) have shown that if the 
performance index is a Lyapunov function with a few mild but 
nevertheless reasonable restrictions on the error criterion a 
policy can be found that has both stabilizing and optimizing 
characteristics. We shall presently define the Lyapunov 
function, and show how Lyapunov* s second method can be used 
mixed policy can be written in a more general form as 
z =^ (y, Hy, y,...) where 2:is a functional. Control policies 
with suoh^ unctional controls give rise to functional differ-
entisûL equations whose stability properties are of recent 
mathematical interest. Given such a class of functional 
controls even to show the existence of optimal controls is 
difficult. 
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In picking out the best stabilization policy among a given 
set of alternative policies. Before proceeding with the new 
method we would like to point out that a function of the form 
(5.7) is a reasonably acceptable objective function for 
economic stabilization policies and we can find examples of 
such a criterion or objective function in the recent economic 
literature.1 
B, Stabilization Models and Lyapunov's Method 
Consider a stationary (time invariant) system of the 
2 following type• 
(5.8) y = éï(y, z) 
which is a vector differential equation analogus to equations 
(3.2) of Chapter ]. Let us assume that the state variables 
y are measured as deviations from the equilibrium values. 
Since no control is exerted after reaching equilibrium we 
must have 
(5.9) y = 6(0, 0) = 0 
at equil 
A control process of the form (5«8) is said to be automatic 
or of the feed back type if the control variable z (a vector) 
at any instant is a function of the state of the system at 
S^ee, for example C. C. Holt (21) and the references 
cited th&re. 
2 A differential system is called stationary or time 
invariant if the differential equations do not contain time 
explicitly. 
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that time. Then we may write 
z = z (y) 
and 
(5.10) y = 6(y, z(y)) = g (y), 
If V(y) measures the distance of y from the origin (the 
equilibrium position) it is intuitively obvious that for the 
stability of the system (5.10) it is sufficient if (assuming 
y^  ^0, else there is no problem), 
(5.11) v(y) = dv(y) = JZ ^ v(y) Vi = H ^v(y) bAj) < 0 
dt 1=1 TTi 1=1 
This idea is clearly spelled out in the following theorem due 
to Lyapunov* 
Theorem 5.1 (Lyapunov) 
A dynamic system (5.10) is stable in the sense that it 
returns to equilibrium after any disturbance from it if there 
exists a "Lyapunov function"^  V(y), a real valued (scalar) 
function with continuous first partial derivatives with 
respect to y and t such that* 
(I) V(y) >0 for all y/O 
(II) V(y) < 0 for all y^ O 
(iH)V(O) = V(0) = 0 
If V(y) further satisfies the triangular inequality required 
of a distance function then V(y) can be regarded as a measure 
proof of this theorem can be found In H. E. Kalman 
and J. E. Bertram (26). 
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of distance of y from the origin. 
The procedure of choosing the best control using 
Lyapunov's second method was described by LaSalle as follows* 
"One approach to the problem of control is that of finding a 
suitable Lyapunov function V(y), Then V(y) depends on both 
y and z within the allowable set of control functions we can 
pick out a subset of controls which give an asymptotically 
stable system. Then within this svbset of stable controls we 
can on the basis of other criteria or experimentation select 
the ona tliat is best. (But) it is not necessary to proceed 
in this fashion. We may begin by optimization if we are 
certain that the optimization implies stability" (J.P. LaSalle, 
1962, p. 6). 
Consider the following identity1 
(5.12) V(y) = 
Define 
V(y) 
(5.13)  ^= mln 
' (y I y f o) 
Then - V|y| ^  or 
Hence we have from (5.12) 
(5.14) V(y)  ^- 7 V(y) 
The time path V(y) satisfying the above differential ine­
quality is majorized^  by the solution of the following 
time path X(t) Is said to be majorized by another time 
path Y(t) if X(t) < Y(t) for all t. 
87 
differential equation: 
(5.15) P = -"^P where p^ = VCy^) 
We therefore have the following inequality* 
(5.16) V(y)  ^V(y^ ) (^-^ t) 
Prom the above inequality we observe that the larger the the 
faster is the approach of V(y) to zero. Given a set of 
alternative policies and the Lyapunov function (that assured 
us asymptotic stability) the choice is made by considering 
the associated auxiliary differential equations (5.15) and 
choosing that policy for which p(t) approaches the origin 
most quickly. 
Let us Illustrate the above approach in terms of Phillips* 
stabilization model with a multiplier. Consider Phillips 
multiplier model and the (linear additive) mixed policy given 
by (5.4) and (5.5). 
(5.5) y = - A-^y + Xz 
(5.4) z = -(^py+fi J y dt + f) 
These two equations can be reduced to the following second 
order linear differential equation; 
(5.17) y + ag y + a^  y = 0 
where ag = A(-^  + ) and a- = 
# 0" 
Defining y^  = y and y^  = yg = y the above second order 
differential equation can equlvalently be written as a system 
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of Wo first order differential equations as follows 
(5.16a) 
= ^ 2 
72 = Yi - ag yg 
or In matrix form 
(5.18) y = A y 
where y = (y-, y ) and A = i 0 1 i 
ri 
It Is a well known corollary of Lyapimov's Theorem that the 
equilibrium y = 0 of the linear system (5.18) is asymptot­
ically stable if and only if given any symmetric positive 
definite matrix C there exists a symmetric positive definite 
matrix H such that 
(5.19) Al H + H A = -0 
For the above 2nd order system taking C = I the matrix H 
satisfying (5.19) can be written ast 
(5. 19a) 1^2\ +/^ 11 1^2\^ ° 
-®2/ \hl2 >^ 2/ \hl2 "22/^ 1 -^ 2/ \ ® " 
which can be simplified to 
1^ 1^  0 —2ai 0 
(5.20) 
\ 
/^ ll\ 
1^2 
rV 1 maw/ 4 
-l\ 
-1 
V / 
1 -ag 
0 2 
The matrix H satisfying (5.19)' c n^ then be written as 
(for C = I) % 
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H 
°2 + Vaai 
2&l &2 
l/2ai 
In order that the system (5.18) be asymptotically stable we 
require the Houth-Hurwltz conditions i aj^ >0 ; ag^ tO 
The above Houth-Hurwltz conditions can be derived from the 
conditions on the elements of Matrix H required to make It 
positive definite (26) consider the following Lyapunov 
function: 
Suppose that we have a set of alternative policies 
available to us depending on the values given to the coeffi­
cients •f'p» and In Phillips* mixed policy. For 
different choices of these parameters the elements In the 
matrix A take different values and consequently the elements 
In the Matrix H also take different values. Let us assume 
that the objective of choice Is to choose that policy which 
will reach the equilibrium most quickly. Under such an 
objective, In general, a policy yielding the maximum value 
of ^2 defined In equation (5.13) Is preferred. For this 
reason we need to coiqnite 9^  for each of the alternative 
(5.22) V(y) = y^ Hy 
Then V(y) = y^  H y + y^  H A y = y^  (A^  H + H A) y 
90 
policies. 
In our illustrative example 
(5.23)  ^
or equlvalently 
(5.23a) min j y^ Hy = 1^  
consider the associated Lagrangian 
(5.24) L = y^ y - '^ (y^ Hy-l) 
The first order condition for minimization of L yields the 
following matrix equationi 
(5.25) (I -7H) y = 0 
The vector y minimizing L satisfies the matrix equation 
(5.25). Since the value of the quadratic form y^ y for a 
given characteristic vector satisfying the equation (5.25) 
is equal to the associated characteristic root, the ^  we 
are interested in is the smallest characteristic root of 
(5.25)^ . ^  is the smallest characteristic root of the 
matrix since (5.25) can equivalently be written as 
-^ I) y = 0. Since the characteristic roots of 
are the reciprocals of the characteristic roots of H,^  is 
also the maximlm characteristic root of H. Since H is 
P^or, premultiplyin* (5.25) by yl 
yly - %ylHy = 0 or yly = y^ Hy = y ( '/ y^ Hy = 1 ) 
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positive definite and symmetric 7^  which is real and positive 
exists (R, G. D. Allen, 1963, p. 469), 
Now consider the following alternative stabilization 
policies investgated by Phillips; 
(1) = 0 and f p > 0 (proportional policy) 
In this case a^  = = 0 
ag = AS-dliol 
1 +A 
Since a^  and a^  violate the Routh-Hurwltz conditions the 
policy does not restore equilibrium. For the proportional 
policy attempts to reduce only the absolute deviation 
existing at a given moment; at each Instant there might 
still be some deviation in output that affects the future 
course of output. 
(II) > 0; j"p >0 and = 0 (proportional plus Integral 
policy) 
In this case - Aand &2 = » 
Since a^  > 0 and ^ 2 > 0 this policy restores equilibrium. It 
appears intuitively that a proportional policy helps to reduce 
the individual deviations at each Instant but an Integral 
policy is needed to secure convergence toward equilibrium. 
(III) : fp >0 ; fi >0 
In this case a. = Ti and an = A (^ +0-0) 
' ' rtjff 
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(proportional plus Integral plus derivative policy) 
Since a^ > 0 and a^ > 0 this policy restores equilibrium. 
An Integral policy In addition to the proportional policy 
can be expected to generate undesirable fluctuations. Such 
fluctuations can be damped down to zero by adding a derivative 
policy. 
For a positive definite Matrix H the largest character­
istic root is given by the formula 
4 + + ^ 1»' . ja-l* * aj)2 a| + (l-a^)^ 
2=1 =2 \l f ^a^ ag 
_ *2 j 
By substituting the specific values for the parameters a^^ and 
a2 can be calculated for cases (11) and (ill). By 
elementary algebraic calculations, it can be verified that 7^ 
is larger under case (ill) than under case (11)^. Thus with 
Ipor the value of under cases (11) and (ill) can be 
written as « 
•/ 8  ^ 2 jp) 
•^ (case 111) = '^ +J'p)^ +(1+Afi+ 
4 ASfi(4+;fp) 
+ 
A^ ( •^ + fp)^ +(l+Afi+ 
Slnoe-rA>0 it can be observed thatvyin case (iiiris larger 
than yj in case (11). 
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The formulation of stabilization policy considered above 
had the criterion of restoring equilibrium most quickly. A 
more Interesting problem, however, Is to choose that policy, 
among a given class of policies, which would minimize an 
"Integrated error" or "cumulative cost" criterion. Thus 
Phillips* stabilization problem can be formulated In the 
following manner; 
Prom the class of all policies of the form 
t 
choos for which the Integral 
is a minimum. 
94 
VI. ESTIMATION AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS IN DYNAMIC 
POLICY MODELS 
A. Methods of Estimation in Dynamic Economic 
Policy Models 
In the previous chapter we investigated stability 
analysis in dynamic policy models. It is desirable to 
distinguish between two types of approaches (l) stability 
analysis and (11) sensitivity analysis. 
By stability analysis we usually mean the study of the 
behavior of the solution In response to a change In the 
Initial conditions assuming no change in the parameters. This 
was our subject matter In the previous chapter. By sensitivity 
analysis we mean the study of the behavior of the solution 
when one or more of the parameters change. In dynamic 
economic policy models we have to recognize that some of the 
parameters of the problem change during the planning horizon. 
For this reason we often require a policy that Is paramet-
rlcally robust I.e. a policy that is optimal In some sense 
even If some of the parameters change. A clear insight Into 
this problem has been provided by Goodwin very recent by (20) 
where he stresses the Importance of finding an exchange rate 
stabilization policy that can only bend emd not break. 
There are several studies of dynamic economle models 
that have emphasized either the purely mathematical nature or 
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the purely statistical nature of the models. Little attention 
has been directed toward making use of mathematical analysis 
of the model to Improve the statistical methodology of esti­
mating the parameters of the model. 
In an economic policy problem the decision taken at any 
Instant depends either directly or Indirectly on the parameters 
of the model. We can not treat the problem of estimating the 
parameters Independently of the prime problem of decision 
making.^  
Let us consider for a moment the logic of the weighted 
least squares method of estimation. The error criterion 
(that Is minimized) of this method gives different weights to 
the deviations in different variables depending on their 
inherent variability. The deviations in a variable whose 
inherent variability is less are given greater weight (so as 
to obtain maximum likelihood). 
In our policy model we are not merely interested in 
"maximum likelihood" while estimating the parameters, we are 
further interested in optimizing the performance index (e. g. 
T^he logic of the approach described in the following 
pages first occurred to the writer while answering a question 
set him by Professor J. K. Sengupta during his written 
preliminary examinations for the Ph.D. in February 1964. If 
the writer recalls correctly, Professor H. Theil mentioned a 
somewhat similar criterion during a seminar presentation he 
gave at Iowa State University in May 19^ .^ However, the 
writer has not been able to find a recognition of this 
approach to estimation of policy models in the published 
literature. 
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maximizing the objective function). The error criterion for 
estimating the parameters in a policy model should therefore 
include besides the usual error criterion the performance 
index (i.e. way, the expected value of the welfare function) 
as well. Such a generalized method of estimation gives 
estimates whose confidence limits depend both on the inherent 
variability of the variables and the sensitivity of the 
performance index to changes in the parameter values. 
Before we investigate estimation methods in such non-
deterministic policy modela, which to the best of the author's 
knowledge (see footnote 1, page 95 of this chapter) has not 
been attempted so far, we should have a considerable knowledge 
of parametric sensitivity in deterministic dynamic economic 
policy models, 
B. Sensitivity in Dynamic Economic Models 
A dynamic economic system with a single variable * 
and a single parameter * a • can be formally written as 
(6.1) ;^ ( %(m), m^-1) %,X, t, a) = 0 
wherej^ ( ^ } denotes the 1th order derivative of the variable 
X . Let us write the solution of equation 
(6.1) as 
(6.2) % = <Ç(t, a) 
How we define the sensitivity coefficient, o , of parameter 
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(6.3) A = 4^ (t. a) -^ (t. a) 
d a A,a-^ 0 A a 
In general ,4 Is a function of t and parameter • a • and 
h e n c e  w e  m i g h t  w r i t e a ) ^ .  
Sensitivity analysis of mathematical models as stated 
above was developed by the Russian mathematicians Andronov 
and Pontryagln (3). 
Differentiating (6.1) with respect to * a * we get 
(6.4) tm-l)+ +5f/g+_££=o 
We can note at once that equation (6.4) always represents 
a linear differential equation of the same order as equation 
(6.1). If equation (6.1) Itself Is linear then equations 
(6.1) and (6.4) have the same homogeneous part. We call 
equation (6.4) the auxiliary sensitivity equation and denote 
It by 
(6.5) L ( , a) = 0 
The above equation (6.5) can be easily solved to get the 
sensitivity coefficient. The coefficient/^ defined in 
equation (6.3) may rightly be called the "first-order 
sensitivity coefficient", for the above equation (6.5) 
itself can be regarded as a dynamic model and we can define 
I^f the dynamic system is in a steady state, is 
independent of t. This analysis can, therefore, be applied, 
as will be seen later, to a static model that can be regarded 
as the steady state of a dynamic system. 
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the "second order sensitivity coefficient" 
S = d^  , and so on. 
da 
A simple illustration of the method can be given using 
the familiar problem in linear computations dealt with by 
Dwyer (15). 
Consider the linear system of equations 
(6.6) *11 Z 1 + *12 ^ 2 = 
= fz + &22 2^ 
Let = ^ 1 ; 3X2 = /f 
11 
Then the auxiliary sensitivity equations for a^  ^are given by 
1^ ^ ®12 1
®21 "^ 1 ^  ®22 = 
2 
2 
whose solutlœis axe 
1 = 
and 
-3C 12 
2^2 
®11 
®21 
®11 
®21 
®12 
®22 
- Z. 
•®22 ^ 1 
«11 «22"®21 ®12 
®21 1^ 
•-11 1^1 ^ 2 " ®12 ®21 ®12 
2^1 ®22 
The results of Dwyer and Wau^  (16) dealing with the 
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effects of discrepancies In the elements of a matrix on the 
elements of Its inverse can also be obtained by the above 
method. Sensitivity analysis of coefficients entering into 
the optimal basis in a linear programming problem »s investi­
gated by Babbar (4) is another possible application. However, 
these possible applications are all to static models and the 
method sensitivity analysis expressed in equations (6.1) 
through (6.5) is more general. For example the sensitivity of 
the time pattern for output y in Phillips* stabilization 
policy for changes in the control parameters (fp, fj^  and f^ ) 
can be approached using the above method of analysis. This 
type of sensitivity analysis can be carried out for any 
numerical or operational dynamic model using either analog 
or digital computer facilities easily available these days. 
C. Sequential Estimation in Economic Policy Models 
One of the Important features of dynamic policy models 
is that more and more information about the state of the 
system is gathered as time goes on. We can not in general 
assume that the structure which existed before the instrument 
or control variables were used to influence the economy 
remains unchanged after such influence is exerted. Hence, it 
is desirable to introduce a sequential estimation procedure 
to keep the structure of the model up to date utilizing all 
available information and to introduce adaptive or feed back 
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mechanisms in decision making. 
Usually any econometric model needed either for fore­
casting or for policy is estimated using the observed values 
of variables in the past periods. A dynamic economic policy 
is characterized by a series of decisions to be taken at 
different instants during the entire planning horizon. 
Let us consider the following policy model in its 
reduced form 
(6.7) = APt-l + 
The parameter matrixes A and B are estimated using the 
well known least squares method. Let us denote the obser­
vations on which the model is estimated initially by (y_Q^ z_Q), 
(y-N+1» (y_i* z_i) and (y^ , z^ ). Let us denote 
by A(o), B(o) the initial estimates of the parameters 
(matrices) A and B. Then A(o) and B(o) are estimated by 
minimizing 
(6.8) Z! (yj^  - y )^  
k=-N  ^ * 
where = Ay^ _^^  + BZj^  
Some of the variables z^  are under the control of the policy 
maker. Either the ezcertlon of the control z(0) or some 
factors external to the system (random or non-random) might 
possibly change the structure of the model in period 1. This 
change In the structure can be taken into account by estimating 
the matrices A and B again in period 1 taking Into account the 
101 
values of and z^ . Let us denote the corresponding matrices 
of estimates "by A(l), B(l), Then A(l) and B(l) are obtained 
by minimizing 
(6.9) ZZ! (yj. - y%)2 
k=-N  ^  ^
In general the estimates A{t) and B(t) at time t are obtained 
by minimizing  ^
(6.10) (Yi. - 7^ ) 
k=-N  ^ * 
While estimating an economic model at any instant econometri-
cians are often confronted with sampled data in the past that 
seem to be abnormal (such as the war years). The inclusion 
of such observations in the sample used for estimating a model 
would give a biased picture of the present state of the 
economy. Further as the economy may have an inherent 
evolutionary change it is desirable to give greater weight 
to deviations in recent years than to the deviations many 
years in the past. For this reason it is more appropriate 
to consider a weighted error criterion of the following type; 
(6.11) è (yj^  - yj.)^  k=-N * « K 
where Wj^  could be such that 
a 1} 0< Wjç < 1 for -N < k < t 
« Oj Wjp ^  ^ • 
The above method of estimation is usually known as the 
weighted least squares filtering hod. 
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